The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old is New Again by Griffith, Kati L
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
2019 
The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old is New Again 
Kati L. Griffith 
Cornell University, kategriffith@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and 
the Labor Relations Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old is New Again 
Abstract 
On the 80th anniversary of the federal wage and hour statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA), critics warn that it cannot keep pace with shifting business trends. More and more individuals 
engage in “contract work,” some of which takes place in the much publicized “gig economy.” These work 
arrangements raise questions about whether these workers are “employees,” covered by U.S. labor and 
employment law, or “independent contractors.” Subcontracting arrangements, or what some call domestic 
outsourcing, are also expanding. Indeed, more and more workers in the U.S. economy engage with 
multiple businesses, raising questions of which of these businesses are “employers” responsible for the 
payment of wages. These are pressing questions for the judiciary, policymakers, scholars of work, and the 
U.S. Department of Labor because many of these individuals work in low-wage sectors and do not make 
minimum wages or overtime premiums for the hours they work. This Article uses a systematic study of 
thousands of pages of legislative history documents to bring a historical lens to the independent 
contractor and joint employer debates that are raging on Capitol Hill and in the courts. It concludes that 
Congress broadly and flexibly worded this New Deal legislation with foresight about the need to cover 
evolving business relationships regardless of business formalities. It calls for a narrow reading of the 
independent contractor category and a broad interpretation of employment relationships that should help 
the FLSA to serve its statutory purpose of ensuring “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work” in the twenty-first 
century. 
Keywords 
Fair Labor Standards Act, contract work, gig economy, wage inequality 
Disciplines 
Dispute Resolution and Arbitration | Labor and Employment Law | Labor Relations 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Cornell University. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
Suggested Citation 
Griffith, K. L. (2019). The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything old is new again [Electronic version]. 
Cornell Law Review, 104(3), 101-150. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1324 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 1 27-JUN-19 9:06
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AT 80:
EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN
Kati L. Griffith†
On the eightieth anniversary of the federal wage and hour
statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), critics
warn that it cannot keep pace with shifting business trends.
More and more individuals engage in “contract work,” some of
which takes place in the much publicized “gig economy.”
These work arrangements raise questions about whether
these workers are “employees,” covered by U.S. labor and
employment law, or “independent contractors.” Subcontract-
ing arrangements, or what some call domestic outsourcing,
are also expanding.  Indeed, more and more workers in the
U.S. economy engage with multiple businesses, raising ques-
tions of which of these businesses are “employers” responsi-
ble for the payment of wages.  These are pressing questions
for the judiciary, policymakers, scholars of work, and the U.S.
Department of Labor because many of these individuals work
in low-wage sectors and do not make minimum wages or over-
time premiums for the hours they work.  This Article uses a
systematic study of thousands of pages of legislative-history
documents to bring a historical lens to the independent con-
tractor and joint employer debates that are raging on Capitol
Hill and in the courts.  It concludes that Congress broadly and
flexibly worded this New Deal legislation with foresight about
the need to cover evolving business relationships regardless of
business formalities.  It calls for a narrow reading of the inde-
pendent contractor category and a broad interpretation of em-
ployment relationships that should help the FLSA to serve its
statutory purpose of ensuring “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s
work” in the twenty-first century.
† Associate Professor of Labor & Employment Law at Cornell’s ILR School.  I
would like to thank Cornell ILR’s Undergraduate Research Program for providing
Geoffrey Rosenthal with funding for the legislative history research.  This Article
benefitted enormously from Geoffrey’s diligence, careful eye, and sharp intellect.
It was a true pleasure to work with him on this project over several years.  The
Article would not have happened without him.  The Article also benefitted from the
insightful comments I received from Andrew Elmore, Leslie Gates, Nicole Hallett,
Michael Harper, Christopher Ioannou, Wilma Liebman, Patricia Kakalec, Patrick
Oakford, and Mark Pedulla.  Conversations about joint employment and theories
of control with Caro Achar, Rose Batt, Deandra Fike, Michael Harper, Michael
Iadevaia, Christopher Ioannou, Tashlin Lakhani, Wilma Liebman, and Seth Lutsic
also shaped my thinking.  I appreciate Christopher Ioannou, Steven Saltz, and the
editors of the Cornell Law Review for their able research and editorial assistance
in the final stages.  All errors and omissions are the responsibility of the author.
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INTRODUCTION
You reach the practice rather than the type of business.
– Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Assistant Attorney General
(1937)1
Born during the Depression-era in the United States, the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the FLSA or the Act) was an
unprecedented governmental effort to demand that businesses
across the country eliminate the practice of child labor and
provide minimum wages for regular hours2 and overtime pre-
miums for long hours.3  When advocating for this New Deal
legislative initiative in 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
said that there is no justification for child labor and that there
is no satisfactory “economic reason for chiseling workers’
wages or stretching workers’ hours.”4  Centrally embedded in
this legislation is the now-somewhat-radical notion that power
imbalances between mighty employers and dependent workers
created injustices that necessitated the federal government’s
1 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Part 1: Hearing on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200
Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the H. Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong.
25 (1937) (statement of Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Department of
Justice) [hereinafter FLSA, Hearing Part 1].
2 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2018).
3 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2018).
4 S.  REP.  NO. 75-884, at 2 (1937).
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establishment of a baseline floor on wages.5  Without this gov-
ernmental intervention, the Roosevelt administration argued,
desperate workers would accept working conditions that fell
below what a “self-supporting and self-respecting democracy”
could tolerate.6  These views ultimately propelled New Deal leg-
islators to pass the FLSA over eighty years ago, in June of
1938.
Eighty years after its passage, the FLSA remains a central
element of U.S. employment law.  The U.S. Department of La-
bor (DOL), the executive agency that enforces the FLSA, esti-
mates that the FLSA currently covers more than 132.8 million
employees.7  Federal minimum wage and overtime complaints
are on the rise in recent years, surpassing even the number of
employment discrimination complaints in some states.8  While
there is extensive praise for the FLSA,9 analysts have pointed
5 Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945) (“[The FLSA]
was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between
employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal com-
pulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered
national health and efficiency and as a result the free movement of goods in
interstate commerce.”).
6 S.  REP.  NO. 75-884, at 2; see also Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 32 (Cal. 2018) (referring to the FLSA and state law and
stating that wage and hour laws “were adopted in recognition of the fact that
individual workers generally possess less bargaining power than a hiring busi-
ness and that workers’ fundamental need to earn income for their families’ sur-
vival may lead them to accept work for substandard wages or working
conditions”).
7 29 C.F.R. § 541 (2004); see also Resources for Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.:
WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers.htm [https://
perma.cc/GU4N-XLAQ] (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (explaining the enforcement
reach of the DOL Wage and Hour Division).
8 Charlotte S. Alexander, Litigation Migrants, 3 (June 29, 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3205435 [https://perma.cc/
AT5G-Q2DR] (noting 400% rise in FLSA litigation between 2000-2016 and stat-
ing, “[a]s of 2016, the FLSA had overtaken employment discrimination as the most
frequently filed type of workplace lawsuit in federal court in Florida, New York,
and Texas, and was coming close in Illinois”); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest
Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1895 (2007) (discuss-
ing revival of FLSA); Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of
Immigration Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125,
146 (2009) (“[The] FLSA, which has been described as a ‘wallflower’ because of its
obscurity behind the better known Title VII, has been experiencing a renaissance
as low-wage migrant worker advocates and private counsel increasingly bring
FLSA suits.”); see also David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour
Collective Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
129, 156 (2003) (noting the growth in “large scale” FLSA litigation involving collec-
tive actions).
9 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2685, 2687 (2008) (considering the failures of labor law to protect collec-
tive activity and “a hydraulic effect” of two seemingly separate statutory regimes,
whereby workers are turning to the FLSA and other employment laws); Hina B.
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out that this New Deal statute faces an “uncertain future.”10  It
has been disparaged as an outdated “geriatric piece of legisla-
tion in need of updating and rejuvenation”11 to keep pace with
twenty-first century business realities.12  For some, the FLSA is
“firmly planted” in the manufacturing context of the 1930s13
and cannot easily reach modern work arrangements, such as
remote and/or virtual work.14
The trend of businesses mislabeling workers as “indepen-
dent contractors,” rather than “employees,” is one reality that
challenges FLSA enforcement.  Studies have confirmed that in-
dependent contractor misclassification is widespread in the
U.S. economy.15  As such, many businesses are not providing
Shah, Broadening Low-Wage Workers’ Access to Justice: Guaranteeing Unpaid
Wages in Targeted Industries, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 9, 44 (2010) (praising
FLSA for providing damages for aggrieved plaintiffs).
10 Jefferson Cowie, The Future of Fair Labor, NY TIMES (June 24, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/opinion/the-future-of-fair-labor.html
[https://perma.cc/8ENY-6EFR] (“Despite this noble history, today the act faces
an uncertain future, thanks to a series of disconcerting shifts in the way we think
about work in America.”).  The FLSA’s exemptions, such as its “white collar ex-
emption” are often critiqued as confusing.  Charlotte S. Alexander & Nathaniel
Grow, Gaming the System: The Exemption of Professional Sports Teams from the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123, 130 (2015); L. Camille
He´bert, “Updating” the “White-Collar” Employee Exemptions to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 128 (2003).  In 1943, legal scholar
Malcolm Davisson referred to the FLSA’s coverage as “a problem of statutory
delineation in [its] application.” Malcolm M. Davisson, Coverage of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 41 MICH. L. REV. 1060, 1060 (1943); see also id. at 1060–61
(noting, six years after the FLSA’s passage, that the variation in business organi-
zational structures is an enforcement challenge).
11 L. Camille He´bert, Forward to Symposium on the Fair Labor Standards Act,
7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 1 (2003).
12 See, e.g., Timothy B. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law?
Accountability for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggrega-
tion, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 206–12 (2011) (explaining “enterprise
disaggregation” and subsequent limitations on legal liability for employers);
Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1, 18–27 (2010) (highlighting the ways in which the current FLSA
scheme fails to deter contractor wage and hour violations); Mitchell H. Rubinstein,
Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and Em-
ployers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer-and-Employee Rela-
tionship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 610 (2012) (highlighting judicial incoherence in
defining “employee” and “employer”); Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for
Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers without Workplaces and Em-
ployees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 255–69 (2006)
(listing various contemporary workplace structures and the FLSA’s failure to keep
up with them).
13 Ernest N. Votaw, The Professional Exemption in the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 511, 523 (1971).
14 Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair
Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. Rev. 1077, 1092–95 (2009).
15 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE:
SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS (2015); CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
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employees with minimum wage and overtime protections.16
There are many incentives for businesses to classify a worker
as an independent contractor.  Such a classification reduces
employers’ costs and their susceptibility to regulation and
litigation.17
It is not always easy, however, to identify independent con-
tractor misclassification.  The DOL alters its standards based
on which political party is in office.  Courts have done little to
clarify things.  They have been inconsistent in the ways that
they have drawn the line between independent contractors and
employees under the FLSA.  Further complicating matters, new
trends raise complicated questions about who is a true inde-
pendent contractor excluded from the Act’s protections.  Most
notably, the recent growth in workers who depend on freelance
or “contract work,” has received a lot of attention.18  For exam-
R40807, TAX GAP: MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
(2011); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION:
IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER ENSURE DETECTION
AND PREVENTION (2009).
16 See Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, U.S. DEPT.
OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassi
fication/ [https://perma.cc/QLZ5-5BXZ]; see also  Administrator’s Interpretation
No. 2015-1, The Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “Suffer or Permit”
Standard in the Identification of Employees Who Are Misclassified as Independent
Contractors, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIVISION (July 15, 2015), https://
web.archive.org/web/20170110070514/www.dol.gov/whd/workers/Misclassifi
cation/AI-2015_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS78-9PSS].
17 Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 2018)
(“[T]he risk that workers who should be treated as employees may be improperly
misclassified as independent contractors is significant in light of the potentially
substantial economic incentives that a business may have in mischaracterizing
some workers as independent contractors.  Such incentives include the unfair
competitive advantage the business may obtain over competitors that properly
classify similar workers as employees and that thereby assume the fiscal and
other responsibilities and burdens that an employer owes to its employees.  In
recent years, the relevant regulatory agencies of both the federal and state govern-
ments have declared that the misclassification of workers as independent con-
tractors rather than employees is a very serious problem, depriving federal and
state governments of billions of dollars in tax revenue and millions of workers of
the labor law protections to which they are entitled.”).
18 See Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative
Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015, at 6–8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, NBER Working Paper No. 22667, 2016), https://krueger.princeton.
edu/sites/default/files/akrueger/files/katz_krueger_cws_-_march_29_201
65.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N6J-MZUT] (noting the significant rise of on-call, con-
tract, and freelancing between 1995 and 2015).  A recent NPR/Marist poll sug-
gested that one in five workers engages in some contract work. NPR/Marist Poll
January 2018: Picture of Work, MARIST POLL (Jan. 22, 2018), http://marist
poll.marist.edu/wp-content/misc/usapolls/us171204_KoC/NPR/NPR_Marist
%20Poll_National%20Nature%20of%20the%20Sample%20and%20Tables_Janu
ary%202018.pdf#page=3 [https://perma.cc/KQM7-NNNG].  Data based on the
Bureau of Labor Statistics questions this number. See Bureau of Labor Statistics,
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 6 27-JUN-19 9:06
562 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:557
ple, the rise of work procured through online platforms, such
as Uber and TaskRabbit, has raised questions about whether
those who contract to perform services for such companies are
statutory employees or independent contractors not covered by
the Act.19  Seth Harris and Alan Krueger’s provocative work
boldly contends that gig economy jobs “do not fit” traditional
definitions of employee under the FLSA.20  A recent New York
Times article proclaimed that legal questions surrounding Uber
drivers “highlights outdated worker protections.”21  These as-
sertions about the current law’s failure to keep pace with mod-
ern work arrangements notwithstanding, given the prevalence
and diversity of such work, it will take federal courts and the
DOL decades to sort out which of these workers are true inde-
pendent contractors under the FLSA’s regime.22
The growth of workplaces involving multiple business enti-
ties is another formidable challenge to the eighty-year-old
FLSA.  In fact, some researchers argue that the proliferation of
subcontracting and outsourcing arrangements, rather than the
growth of the gig economy, is the central dynamic to under-
standing changes in the nature of work.23  In this vein, David
Weil, a management professor who served as DOL Wage and
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements – May 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB. (June 7, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/S8XA-PFMC] (illustrating that workers provided by contract firms,
temporary help agency workers, on-call workers and independent contractors
combined make up just over 10% of the U.S. workforce).
19 See Richard A. Bales & Christian Patrick Woo, The Uber Million Dollar
Question: Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Contractors?, 68 MERCER L.
REV. 461, 472–77 (2017) (explaining Uber’s arguments in favor of independent
contractor status, and its drivers’ arguments in favor of employee status); see also
Omri Ben-Shahar, Opinion, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Answer Will Shape
the Sharing Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/omribenshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-
will-shape-the-sharing-economy/#5c46c1675e55 [https://perma.cc/3GWF-
LFW8] (noting recent litigation over Uber’s employer status).
20 Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws
for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker,” in WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE
AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR, 67 (Kati L. Griffith & Sam Estreicher eds., 2015).
21 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Uber Case Highlights Outdated Worker Protection
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2015, at B-4.
22 James Reif, ‘To Suffer or Permit to Work’: Did Congress and State Legisla-
tures Say What They Meant and Mean What They Said?, 6 N.E. U. L.J. 347,
362–79 (2014).
23 Annette Bernhardt et al., Domestic Outsourcing in the U.S.: A Research
Agenda to Assess Trends and Effects on Job Quality 1–3 (Inst. for Res. on Lab. and
Emp., Working Paper No. 102-16, 2016), http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers
/102-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9KD-78KP]; see also Glynn, supra note 12, at R
204 (arguing that business splintering or outsourcing will continue to grow in
post-recession America).
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Hour Administrator under President Obama, has brought at-
tention to the FLSA enforcement challenges that arise from
recent growth in what he dubs the “fissuring” of businesses.
His book, The Fissured Workplace, draws on case studies and
statistical analyses of administrative data to make a compelling
argument that we can no longer assume the “vertically-inte-
grated” business model.24
Weil’s work illustrates that enforcement of the FLSA has
become more difficult, in part because businesses have “shed”
aspects of their company such as accounting services,25
human resources management,26 janitorial tasks,27 and main-
tenance.28  Instead of keeping these functions “in house,” many
businesses are engaging separate business entities to provide
these services through subcontracting, licensing, and franchis-
ing arrangements.29
According to Weil and others, this fissuring muddles the
legal boundaries of employment relationships because multiple
businesses have effects on wages and working conditions.30
The expanded use of temporary agencies, for instance, often
raises questions about whether the company where the tempo-
rary agency places an individual is an employer, along with the
temporary agency.31  The FLSA holds that each entity qualify-
ing as an “employer” is responsible for minimum wage and
overtime violations, even if it exists alongside other employers
(sometimes referred to as “joint employers”).32
24 DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 3–4 (2014).
25 Id. at 52.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 90.
28 Id. at 55.
29 Id. at 99.
30 Id. at 9.
31 In the agricultural context, these questions are not new.  Farmworkers’
interactions with growers and intermediaries, often referred to as “farm labor
contractors,” raise questions about whether they have one or two employers. See
Annie Smith & Patricia Kakalec, Joint Employment in the Agricultural Sector, in
WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 20, at 379, 380–81; see R
also Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 153 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that a certified nursing assistant had joint employment with a hospital
and a referral agency that referred her to work at the hospital); Pfohl v. Farmers
Ins. Group, No. CV03-3080, 2004 WL 554834, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2004)
(holding that an insurance company employer, along with the temporary agency,
was not a “joint employer”); Catani v. Chiodi, Civ. No. 00-1559 (DWF/RLE), 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17023, at *20 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2001) (holding that a temporary
staffing agency, which only conducted payroll services, was not a joint employer).
32 See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2018); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2018).
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The growth of contracting and other forms of splintered
business arrangements in recent years challenges policymak-
ers, the courts, and the DOL.33  These challenges to the FLSA,
as well as others, have led many to call for reform of the FLSA’s
language34 and to offer new theories of liability35 that, ostensi-
bly, would fit better with evolving working arrangements.
Some have even called for a new “independent worker” regula-
tory category that would incorporate some aspects of the em-
ployment relationship and some aspects of the independent
contractor relationship.36
On the other end of the spectrum, business allies have
challenged the FLSA, not for its failure to broadly cover evolving
business relationships, but because it has reached too broadly.
These concerns stem from a recent FLSA court case and a
33 See also W. Jonathan Martin II et al., Labor and Employment Law, 68
MERCER L. REV. 1061, 1070 (2017) (citing Garcia-Celestino v. Ruiz Harvesting,
Inc., 843 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2016)). See generally David Borgen, Advanced
Issues in FLSA Collective Actions: Joint Employment, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
447 (2006) (discussing developments in joint employer law).
34 Professor Mack Player, for example, argues that the language is confusing
and thus leads to excessive litigation.  Player contends that Congress should
amend the FLSA to cover all the employers that affect commerce.  Mack A. Player,
Enterprise Coverage Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: An Assessment of the
First Generation, 28 VAND. L. REV. 283, 346–47 (1975).  For other critiques, see
Scott D. Miller, Work/Life Balance and the White-Collar Employee Under the FLSA,
7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 7, 33, 46 (2003) (suggesting amendments to the
FLSA to promote healthy work life balance in the United States).
35 See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Mort, Beyond Joint Employers: Other Theories of
Franchisor Liability, in WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEED-
INGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note
20, at 397, 397–407; Alan Hyde, Nonemployer Responsibility for Labor Conditions, R
in WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 20, at 409, 409–17; R
Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
661, 665 (2013) (arguing that, to consider employment status, decision-makers
should “differentiate between members and nonmembers of an economic firm”
and whether the workers are “participants in a common economic enterprise
organized into a business entity”); Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based
Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002) (“Trademark owners who
authorize franchisees, subsidiaries, affiliates, and other licensees to use the own-
ers’ trademarks to identify themselves or their products to customers should be
jointly and severally obligated for the licensees’ liabilities to those customers.”);
Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Essay, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2016) (arguing that the focus should be on how
much flexibility workers have in defining the contours of their work lives).
36 Harris & Krueger, supra note 20, at 37.  For critique of this category see R
Lawrence Mishel & Ross Eisenbrey, Uber Business Model Does Not Justify a New
“Independent Worker” Category, WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra
note 20, at 109, 109–11.  For a call for rights for “dependent contractors” see R
Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining
Rights for “Dependent Contractors”, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2005).
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recent decision from the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).  In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit expansively portrayed the FLSA’s joint employer reach
as applying when two or more business entities “share, agree to
allocate responsibility for, or otherwise codetermine—formally
or informally, directly or indirectly—the essential terms and
conditions of the worker’s employment.”37
This formulation of the employment relationship means
that businesses that indirectly determine essential terms and
conditions of employment are “employers” responsible for wage
and hour violations, along with the businesses that directly
make these determinations.  In its August 2015 Browning-Fer-
ris decision, the NLRB stated that two or more employers can
be joint employers of the same employees if they “share or
codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and
conditions of employment.”38  This formulation of the bounda-
ries of the employment relationship, similar to the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s, would extend to businesses that “codetermine” terms
and conditions of employment even if they do not have direct
control over the terms and conditions.
As a result of these broad interpretations of the boundaries
of the employment relationship, Congress is currently consid-
ering a bill that would amend the FLSA and the NLRA in an
37 Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir. 2017).
For critique, see Bill Summary, Save Local Business Act, COMMITTEE ON EDUC. &
WORKFORCE (July 27, 2017), https://edworkforce.house.gov/news/documentsin-
gle.aspx?DocumentID=401930 [https://perma.cc/C54R-ZRTZ] (“Unfortunately,
unelected NLRB bureaucrats, federal regulators, and activist judges have taken
steps to dramatically change what constitutes a ‘joint employer,’ creating uncer-
tainty for America’s job creators and entrepreneurs. . . . In January 2017, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted an expansive new joint employer
standard under the FLSA in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc.  The new test
finds joint employer status under the FLSA where ‘two or more persons or entities
are not completely disassociated . . .’ with respect to their separate workplaces.
The Fourth Circuit’s test seems to make any relationship or collaboration between
two businesses a joint employment relationship because the two entities will not
be completely disassociated.  To make matters worse, Salinas states that ‘one
factor alone can serve as the basis for finding that two or more . . . entities are not
completely disassociated.’ This test is even broader than the joint employer test
under Browning-Ferris, and has contributed to a growing patchwork of joint em-
ployer standards across the country.”).
38 If a common-law employment relationship exists between the parties, the
Board will then inquire “whether the putative joint employer possesses sufficient
control over employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to permit
meaningful collective bargaining.”  It will also “no longer require that a joint em-
ployer not only possess the authority to control employees’ terms and conditions
of employment, but also exercise that authority.”  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ca.,
Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 6–7. (Aug. 27, 2015) (3–2 decision) aff’d in part,
rev’d in part and remanded, No. 16-1028 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 2018).
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effort to restrict regulation of secondary businesses.  If this
legislation is successful it would narrow the definitions of the
employment relationship to only apply where a business has
“direct and immediate” control over a worker’s activities.39
This proposed bill, currently entitled the Save Local Business
Act, H.R. 3441, has provoked heated arguments among legisla-
tors on both sides of the aisle and would constitute a major
change in the FLSA’s reach.40
This Article uses a historical analysis of the FLSA’s legisla-
tive beginnings to contend that the FLSA’s expansive and flexi-
ble definitions of employment were intentional and provide
courts and administrators with what they need to help the
FLSA thrive in the twenty-first century.  It also reveals that
evolving business relationships and structures, including busi-
ness splintering, are not unprecedented.  In 1944, six years
after the FLSA’s enactment, the U.S. Supreme Court observed
the “[m]yriad forms of service relationships, with infinite and
subtle variations in the terms of employment, [that] blanket the
nation’s economy.”41  In the late 1930s, when enacting the
FLSA, Congress acknowledged and foresaw the challenges of
varied business forms and sought to address them with broad
and pliable statutory language defining the employment rela-
tionship.  This legislative foresight is quite remarkable and it is
what prompted me to include in the title of this Article, the
39 Save Local Business Act, H.R. 3441, 115th Cong. § 2(a)(B) (2017) (“A per-
son may be considered a joint employer in relation to an employee only if such
person directly, actually, and immediately, and not in a limited and routine man-
ner, exercises significant control over essential terms and conditions of employ-
ment, such as hiring employees, discharging employees, determining individual
employee rates of pay and benefits, day-to-day supervision of employees, as-
signing individual work schedules, positions, and tasks, or administering em-
ployee discipline.”).  Rep. Bradley Byrne (R-AL) introduced H.R. 3441 in the House
of Representatives on July 27, 2017.  The same day, Congress referred it to the
House Committee on Education and the Workforce.  On September 13, 2017, the
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections and the Subcommittee on Health, Em-
ployment, Labor, and Pensions held hearings on the bill.  On November 7, 2017,
the House passed it with a vote of 242–181.  The Senate received H.R. 3441 on
November 8, 2017.  The Senate has not yet taken further action on the bill.
40 See generally Hassan A. Kanu & Tyrone Richardson, Lawmakers in Alter-
nate Universes on Joint Employer Issue, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 12, 2017), https://
www.bna.com/lawmakers-alternate-universes-n73014461636 [https://perma.cc
/TQ5R-TG4W] (noting Democrat and Republican arguments on joint employer
liability); Tyrone Richardson & Hassan A. Kanu, Congress: Republican
Lawmakers Plan Rollout of Joint Employer Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 6, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/republican-lawmakers-plan-n73014461289 [https://
perma.cc/HP8U-R9L7]; Ben Penn & Chris Opfer, DOL Changes Course on Worker
Classification, Joint Employers, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 7, 2017), https://www.
bna.com/dol-changes-course-n73014452985 [https://perma.cc/DSV3-MKSQ].
41 NLRB v. Hearst Publs., Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126 (1944).
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saying that “Everything Old is New Again.”  By bringing this
historical lens, the Article provides a new perspective to the
independent contractor and joint employer debates that are
currently raging on Capitol Hill and in the courts.42  The histor-
ical viewpoint calls for a narrow reading of the independent
contractor category and a broad interpretation of employment
relationships—including joint employer relationships—that
should help the FLSA to serve its New Deal-era statutory pur-
poses of ensuring minimum wages and overtime premiums to
low-wage workers.
The Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, the Article ana-
lyzes Congress’ purposes with respect to the FLSA’s application
to employment relationships through an intensive study of the
FLSA’s legislative history.  The Article’s systematic review of the
FLSA’s legislative path in 1937 and 1938 included the hearings
(4 total), reports (6 total), and debates (14 total) that took place
before the bill’s enactment in June of 1938.  As Part I will flesh
out further, this examination illustrates that the framers of the
FLSA, concerned about enforcement challenges, intentionally
used broad and malleable language.  Even though they did
allow notable and problematic exemptions for such areas as
agricultural labor and domestic work,43 New Deal legislators
42 There has been partisan disagreement regarding H.R. 3441’s impact on the
FLSA. Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA), ranking member of the House Committee on
Education and the Workforce, heavily criticized the bill and its disruption of the
FLSA in a Fact Sheet released on September 8, 2017. Fact Sheet, H.R. 3441: The
“Save Local Business Act of 2017”, COMMITTEE ON EDUC. & WORKFORCE DEMOCRATS
(2017), https://democrats-edworkforce.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-09-
08%20Joint%20Employer%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2TJ-KP85]
(“H.R. 3441 replaces almost a century of law with chaos, creating uncertainty for
workers and enabling unscrupulous employers to evade obligations under . . . the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). . . . When Congress passed the FLSA . . . it
sought to ensure that client employers who control the economic realities of their
subcontracted employees will be legally responsible for their subcontractors’ com-
pliance.  This bill enables joint employers to escape liability by narrowing the
definition of who is a joint employer to only those who exercise direct control over
all aspects of the employment relationship, even if the client employer establishes
the economic realities of the employment relationship.”).  Unsurprisingly, Repub-
licans take a different view of H.R. 3441, as outlined in a Fact Sheet released by
the Republican-led House Committee on Education and the Workforce.  Fact
Sheet, Save Local Business Act, COMMITTEE ON EDUC. & WORKFORCE (2017), https:/
/edworkforce.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=401927
[https://perma.cc/GS7G-RPK2] (“Hiring.  Work schedules.  Pay increases.  These
are all decisions that take place between an employer and employee. . . .  During
the Obama administration, regulators and activist judges also expanded the joint
employer scheme under the FLSA.  Although the Trump administration has taken
steps to provide some relief, further action is needed to provide certainty for
America’s job creators and prevent future federal overreach.”).
43 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718-676, 52 Stat. 1060,
1067 (carving out an exclusion for agricultural workers); see also 82 CONG. REC.
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and administrators feared that too much specificity in the defi-
nition of employment would make it unadaptable to evolving
business relationships and structures.  They feared the speci-
ficity would encourage some businesses to splinter off parts of
their business organizations in an effort to evade the FLSA’s
reach.  They did not want formalities such as labels, contracts,
place of work, or manner of payment to dictate who is in and
who is out when it comes to the FLSA’s coverage of employment
relationships.
While twenty-first century businesses are certainly differ-
ent from their vertically-integrated New Deal counterparts, the
idea that some business arrangements would make it difficult
to enforce the FLSA is not a new dynamic of our twenty-first
century economy.  In fact, one of the first proposed versions of
the FLSA, introduced in 1937, explicitly recognized that a ma-
jor enforcement challenge would be that some businesses
would misclassify true employees as “independent contrac-
tors,” thereby erroneously depriving workers of the FLSA’s
wage-and-hour protections.44
In Part II, the Article uses Part I’s historical analysis to
reconsider the FLSA’s viability in the face of recent growth in
contracting and other forms of business fissuring.  It contends
that courts, the DOL, and policymakers need to embrace this
past in order to improve the FLSA’s viability and stated pur-
poses in the twenty-first century.  Similar to what some schol-
1,469 (1937) (statement of Rep. Emmanuel Celler) (“Frankly, what is all the shoot-
ing for? This bill excludes agricultural workers, domestic workers, those engaged
in dairy farming, cotton processors, as well as those in the canning industries;
salesmen, both on the inside as well as those working on the outside, are ex-
cluded; and all workers involved in seasonal industries are outside of the provi-
sions of the bill.”); Kati L. Griffith, The Power of a Presumption: California as a
Laboratory for Unauthorized Immigrant Workers’ Rights, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1279, 1309–15 (2017) (describing legislative history behind agricultural exclusion
and the view that the exclusion was a political compromise to get the bill passed);
Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New
Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2289 (1998) (“As signed by
Roosevelt on June 25, 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act contained a broad
definition of ‘employee,’ but exempted from the statute’s maximum—hour provi-
sions ‘executive, administrative, and professional’ employees.”).  For a recent
Court case allowing for a broader reading of exemptions, see Encino Motorcars,
LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (“Because the FLSA gives no ‘textual
indication’ that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, ‘there is no reason
to give [them] anything other than a fair (rather than a ‘narrow’) interpretation.’”).
44 S. 2475, 75th Cong. § 2(7) (1937) (“The Board shall have power to . . .
determin[e] the number of employees employed by any employer to prevent the
circumvention of the Act . . . through the use of agents, independent contractors,
subsidiary or controlled companies, or home or off-premises employees, or by any
other means or device”).
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ars have shown in the National Labor Relations Act context,45
the FLSA’s legislative history reveals that courts and the DOL
have too often interpreted the reach of the FLSA too narrowly.46
The FLSA’s past reminds us that Congress intended the
FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime protections to reach all
businesses that allow work to be performed on their behalf and
have the power to affect wage and hour compliance, regardless
of indirect business relationships and business formalities.  In
the words of then Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson
represented at the outset of this Article, the FLSA reaches
those entities that bear responsibility for the failure to pay
baseline wages, regardless of the “type of business.”  This legis-
lative history examination serves as support for legislators,
courts, bureaucrats, and scholars who call for an expansive
reading of the FLSA’s reach and to those who promote a revital-
ization of the FLSA to address the evolving nature of work
relationships.  Only then can the eighty-year-old FLSA serve its
statutory purpose of ensuring “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s
work”47 in the twenty-first century.
I
HISTORICAL LESSONS: THE FLSA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Since the Article relies mainly on legislative history for the
analysis that follows, it is worth noting at the outset the
strengths and limits of legislative history as an interpretive
tool.  The main sources of “legislative history” are the reports,
debates, and hearings that occur as a bill makes its way
through the legislative process before enactment.  There is sig-
nificant debate about whether legislative history can tell us
anything about the intent behind a piece of enacted legislation.
Critics of reliance on legislative history rightly point out that a
group of individual legislators simply cannot have a joint in-
tent.48  Plainly put, it is a fiction to suggest that a group of
45 ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON
LABOR RIGHTS 36–37 (2006); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner
Act and the Origins of the Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 265, 318 (1978)).
46 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment
in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1704–14 (2016) (noting that judges
narrowly construe the meaning of “control” due to lack of a clear standard); Bruce
Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweat-
shop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983,
1103 (1999) (critiquing the judiciary’s narrow reading of “employ”).
47 S.  REP.  NO. 75-884, at 2 (1937).
48 Kati L. Griffith, When Federal Immigration Exclusion Meets Subfederal
Workplace Inclusion: A Forensic Approach to Legislative History, 17 N.Y.U. J.
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people shared the same thoughts when they voted for the legis-
lation.  Others draw from public choice theory to argue that the
“true intents” behind legislation are brokered deals that result
from the pressure of powerful lobbyists and interest groups.49
Thus, for public-choice theorists, there are no high-minded
public-interest-based intents, but rather intents to please in-
fluential groups that often do not represent the broader public
good.50  They view a piece of legislation as representative of the
efficacy of power and money in politics, not popular will.51
These hard-hitting critiques of legislative history notwith-
standing, this Article takes the position that legislative history
does have useful interpretive value.  The Article does not intend
to use legislative history to ferret out the true underlying in-
tents of the legislators.  Instead, it uses legislative history to
help interpret what the stated meanings and purposes of the
statute were when it was making its way through the legislative
process.  Regardless of the “true intents” of individual legisla-
tors, the legislative history can illuminate the statutory pur-
poses and interpretations that congressional representatives
set forth on the record.  While there are certainly skeptics in the
judiciary, the stated views of legislators do carry some weight
when it comes to law and policy analysis.  Judges, when mak-
ing legal determinations about how to apply a statute to a
particular situation, are tasked with determining how Con-
gress would apply the law to the situation.  Many judges look to
statutory language, case law precedent, and legislative history
to inform their determinations of what Congress meant when it
used particular statutory language.
We should take care, however, in how we use legislative
history as an interpretive tool.  I find persuasive the critique
that many courts and legal scholars have misused legislative
history documents by cherry-picking the helpful pieces, rather
than looking at the full body of documentation more objec-
tively.  This misuse of legislative-history documents fuels those
who aim to entirely discredit legislative history as an interpre-
tive tool.  To offset the common tendency in legal analysis to
cherry-pick, I have developed “a forensic approach to legislative
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 881, 892 (2014) (describing the various views involved in the
debate over reliance on legislative history in legal analysis).
49 Id. at 893.
50 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of
Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 248, 249 n.133 (2000).
51 See, e.g., EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE: A PRIMER, 36–37 (The Inst. of
Econ. Affairs ed., 2012), https://ccs.in/sites/all/books/com_books/public-
choice-a-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY2D-LPBT].
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history.”  This approach proposes a more objective, systematic,
and comprehensive analysis of legislative history to avoid these
pitfalls.52  The Article uses that approach here.  The analysis
put forth here emerges from a systematic review of all of the
FLSA’s legislative history from 1937 and 1938.  It considered
all references to employ, employee, and employer in the legisla-
tive history, as well as any discussion of the FLSA’s enforce-
ment machinery and coverage.53  My Research Assistant and I
reviewed all reports, debates, and hearings related to the pro-
posed bill.
As the Article will further elaborate upon below, a central
theme that emerged from this “forensic” review of the FLSA’s
legislative history was a desire to cover businesses who allow
work to be done on their behalf and are in a position to prevent
wage and hour abuses, regardless of indirect business relation-
ships and business formalities.  It also revealed that New Deal
congressional and administrative representatives were well
aware of the changing nature of business organizations and
practices, including the practices of contracting, subcontract-
ing, and other kinds of splintering.  Their statements on the
record denote that they intended to reach these practices re-
gardless of whether businesses used these intentionally in an
effort to avoid the FLSA’s reach, or whether businesses used
these practices simply as a non-evasive response to economic
circumstances.  Nonetheless, the legislative history consist-
ently shows an intent to make sure that the FLSA has blanket-
type coverage of the low-wage workforce and that there are not
loopholes in coverage that create incentives for businesses to
splinter off work.  In the subparts that follow, the Article ex-
plains three central observations flowing from my comprehen-
sive legislative history review that relate to these overarching
themes.
A. Covering Indirect Relationships Regardless of Business
Form
The FLSA’s legislative history illustrates that the FLSA’s
framers intended to reduce incentives for businesses to use
intermediaries, or to change form, in order to gain exclusion
from the Act’s coverage.  In the words of these New Deal legisla-
tors and administrators, they intended to restrict businesses
52 Griffith, supra note 48, at 900–01. R
53 We engaged targeted searches of the documents for these terms, but also
read through the documents in their entirety to avoid missing relevant discus-
sions that did not use these specific terms.
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from avoiding coverage through “means or device[s]” of eva-
sion54 that would distance themselves from front-line workers.
Moreover, the legislative history overwhelmingly communicates
that one of Congress’ purposes was for those interpreting the
FLSA to have some leeway to adapt as businesses restructured
in response to economic circumstances, or to evade liability
under the Act.
The observations presented in this subpart, along with the
two that follow it, all relate to discussions that emerged origi-
nally from a particular provision that the drafters included in
the first version of the wage and hour bill in 1937.  Senator
Hugo Black (D-Ala.) and Representative William Connery (D-
Mass.) first introduced this proposed legislation, then referred
to as the Black-Connery bill, on May 24, 1937.  It included
§ 6(a), a provision which would set up a Board to administer
the Act.  This Board would have the power to establish a cover-
age threshold for businesses; specifically, it would set a mini-
mum number of employees in a business for purposes of
coverage.  The purpose of this power was to enable the Board to
set the coverage threshold number in ways that would “pre-
vent” businesses from circumventing the Act through tools of
evasion.  The proposed provision, 6(a), stated in full:
The Board shall have power to . . . determin[e] the number of
employees employed by any employer to prevent the circum-
vention of the [A]ct . . . through the use of agents, indepen-
dent contractors, subsidiary or controlled companies, or
home or off-premise employees, or by any other means or
device.55
This language shows that from the outset, legislators were
well aware that some businesses would use intermediaries to
try to evade coverage.  It confirms that the FLSA’s framers
wanted to render these kinds of tools of evasion ineffective.  It
specifically called out the misclassification of independent con-
tractors as one type of problematic device.  It also referenced
the use of separate splintered-off business entities, such as
subsidiaries, agents, or “controlled companies,” as common
methods of evasion.  As the following subpart will elaborate
upon, Congress was also concerned about off-premises work,
such as industrial homework, as an evasive tactic.
The plain language of this proposed provision § 6(a) ex-
poses that Congress did not want to allow businesses who were
54 S. 2475, 75th Cong. § 6(a) (1937).
55 Id.
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responsible for wage and hour compliance to escape coverage
by changing the way the business was organized or catego-
rized.  The words of U.S. Assistant Attorney General Robert
Jackson, presented at the outset of this Article, illustrate this
point well.  Jackson, who later served as U.S. Solicitor General,
U.S. Attorney General, and then U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
avowed that “it does not make very much difference whether it
is a chain store, a group of manufacturing plants, or an individ-
ual.  You reach the practice rather than the type of business.”56
Furthermore, the plain language of this proposed provision
exhibits congressional foresight about the evolving nature of
businesses, as well as the evolving nature of tools of evasion.  It
shows an awareness that courts and administrators would
need to continually adapt to changing business practices.  No-
tably, the language of § 6(a) represented above, after including
a list of specific tools of evasion, also added “or by any other
means or device” as a catchall phrase.  This open-ended lan-
guage shows congressional intent to cover evolving business
arrangements and employment relationships that may not
have been known to Congress in the 1930s.
In the next two subparts, the Article continues to trace how
discussions about this initial proposed provision, § 6(a), illus-
trate that the FLSA’s broad and flexible language resulted from
an effort to adapt to evolving business practices and to reduce
business incentives to change form, or splinter off work to in-
termediaries, to avoid the FLSA’s reach.  In this way, the Article
demonstrates that Weil’s concept of business fissuring, or
splintering, has New Deal roots.
B. Covering Off-Premises Work, Piecework, and
Commission Work
Throughout the FLSA’s legislative path, legislators ex-
pressed further trepidation about “splintering” and business
formalities getting in the way of the FLSA’s purposes in its
discussions of off-premises work and piecework.  Off-premises
work is work that occurs away from workspaces that a busi-
ness owns or leases.57  Piecework is work that is compensated
by the number of “pieces” completed, rather than by the num-
ber of hours worked.58  Much of, but not all of, the work de-
56 FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 25 (statement of Robert H. Jackson, R
Assistant Att’y Gen., Department of Justice).
57 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.11, 785.12 (2018).
58 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 530.1(d), 778.418; see also Industrial Homework, U.S.
DEPT. OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/industrialhomework
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scribed in this regard involved “industrial homework,” clothing,
or other types of assembly work performed at home, but which
ultimately benefitted a large business.59  Moreover, much of
this work involved big businesses subcontracting with small
contractors (jobbers) in the garment/textile industry who then
contracted with homeworkers.  Other home-based work in-
cluded such things as assembly of jewelry, tobacco products,
and children’s toys.60  This common New-Deal-era business
practice was sometimes referred to as “the sweating system,”
because of the small profit margins for contractors, and the
often dismal working conditions for those individuals perform-
ing the labor.
The use of industrial homework and small “sweatshop”
contractors in the textile industry are historical examples of
breaking away, or fissuring, pieces of the work from a business’
central operation.  Professor Matthew Finkin’s historical work
in this area highlights that the question of whether to regulate
industrial homework was “hotly contested” in the years leading
up to the FLSA’s enactment.61  As this subpart will elucidate
further, the FLSA’s legislative history relating to off-premises
work and piecework illustrates congressional purposes to in-
clude broad language that would reach some businesses who
are responsible for work performed, even if a separate entity
directly controls most aspects of the working conditions.  It also
portrays that Congress wanted to reduce incentives to splinter
off aspects of a business for the purpose of evading the Act’s
reach.
Section 6(a) of the initial proposed bill, discussed above,
explicitly mentioned the use of off-premises employees as a
practice that would not make a business immune from the
FLSA’s responsibilities.  The legislative history is replete with
examples of witnesses, administrators, and legislators who
worried that the Act would exclude businesses who engage off-
premises workers and pieceworkers from the FLSA’s protec-
tions.  During the FLSA’s path toward enactment, many voices
[https://perma.cc/D5WB-82BD]; Fact Sheet #24: Homeworkers Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/
compliance/whdfs24.htm [https://perma.cc/KF7N-YJDZ].
59 See FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 196–97 (statement of Frances R
Perkins, Secretary of Labor, Department of Labor) (“The industrial home worker is
a person who takes work home into his own house or tenement where he or his
family work on it within the confines of their own home.”).
60 Matthew W. Finkin, Beclouded Work, Beclouded Workers in Historical Per-
spective, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 603, 607 (2016) (citing Emily Brown, U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Women’s Bureau Bull. No. 79, INDUSTRIAL HOMEWORK (1930)).
61 Id.
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expressed distress about the poor conditions of work per-
formed at home for the adults and children that were involved
in this practice.62  Civil society voices, such as the National
Child Labor Committee, spoke out against industrial home-
work during the hearings on the legislation.63  Legislators mir-
rored these worries in their comments.  Representative Arthur
Healey (D-Mass.), for instance, recognized the problem of in-
dustrial homework.  He noted during the hearings that ex-
ploitative businesses were turning “homes into sweatshops,”
thereby endangering workers’ health in exchange for “pitifully
meager wages.”64  Representative William J. Fitzgerald (D-
Conn.) referred to industrial homework as “the biggest indus-
trial cancer on the industrial life of America today[.]”65  He was
apprehensive about the perverse incentives that the legislation
would create if its requirements did not reach industrial home-
62 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Part 2: Hearing on S. 2475 and H.R.
7200 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the H. Comm. on Labor, 75th
Cong. 590 (1937) (statement of Earl Constantine, National Association of Hosiery
Manufacturers) [hereinafter FLSA Hearing, Part 2] (“If these restrictions in hours
and wages are not universally applied . . . you invite a type of home industry, and
child labor . . . which I think would be unfortunate.”); id. at 521 (statement of Roy
A. Cheney, Managing Director, Underwear Institute) (calling for full abolishment
of home work); id. at 467 (statement of Professor Paul F. Brissenden, Millinery
Manufacturing Industry) (recommending that “the definition of ‘employee’. . .
[include] . . . the stringent regulation of industrial home work, if not its outright
prohibition”).
63 Id. at 402 (statement of Courtenay Dinwiddie, General Secretary, National
Child Labor Committee) (referring to it as “one of the most vicious and persistent
practices for sweating labor ever devised.  The labor of whole families is secured
for starvation pay and child labor is grossly abused in any process that children of
any age can perform.  Long consideration of this evil has convinced all who know
the facts that the only solution is to abolish home work.  It cannot be regulated or
controlled by any half-way measures.  We believe, therefore, that the language of
section 6 (a) of the bill on this subject is inadequate and should be modified so
that it will clearly give the power to do away with this sweatshop practice”); id. at
408–09 (statement of Lucy Randolph Mason, General Secretary, National Con-
sumers’ League) (“We are glad to note that the bill contemplates some regulation
of industrial home work.”). But see id. at 979 (statement of L.C. Painter, Associa-
tion for Progressive Political Action) (“Any statute that would dictate what you
must or must not do in your own home, in your own private business or with your
own private money, is communistic.”).
64 Id. at 832 (statement of Hon. Arthur D. Healey) (“Here whole families,
including children of tender years, work into the long hours of the night on tasks
beyond their physical stamina, which undermine and endanger health, for piti-
fully meager wages.”); see also 83 CONG. REC. 7298 (1938) (statement of Rep.
Hamilton Fish) (“This bill seeks to put an end to sweatshop wages and hours and
to intolerable labor conditions in certain factories, mills, and mines doing inter-
state business where employees are working long hours and getting starvation
wages. . . . We have by this bill a chance to strike a blow for social and industrial
justice and a square deal for labor in America[.]”).
65 FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 77 (statements of Robert H. Jackson, R
Asst. Att’y Gen., Department. of Justice and Rep. Fitzgerald).
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work.  Along these lines, he warned about the potential for
perverse incentives to break off parts of the work.  Namely,
Fitzgerald expressed that exclusion of industrial homework
would encourage “unfair manufacturers” to “extend the home
work racket in this country by taking work out of the factory
and putting it into the homes at miserable wages[.]”66
As Fitzgerald’s comment exemplifies, the FLSA’s legislative
history contains extensive expressions of concern that if indus-
trial homework or piecework arrangements were not covered by
the statute, some employers would break off parts of their in-
house work to avoid coverage.  President Roosevelt’s highly re-
garded U.S. Secretary of Labor,67 Frances Perkins, admonished
that industrial homework was “[a]nother method of evading the
provisions of wage and hour legislation.”68  Perkins was fearful
that, if the FLSA did not cover off-premises work, businesses
would further split up work into sweatshops and homework
arrangements to avoid the Act’s coverage.  U.S. Assistant Attor-
ney General Robert Jackson, another key player in the
Roosevelt administration, echoed unease about industrial
homework.  He assured legislators that while families that
make a “little commodity which is a homecraft” would be ex-
cluded from the bill, “the factory which sends out and makes
use of people in their homes are not exempted just because
they are using premises they do not pay any rent for.”69  A
number of federal courts have cited this aspect of the FLSA’s
legislative history to support the conclusion that the FLSA’s
minimum wage and overtime protections cover work performed
at home.70
66 Id. (statements of Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Department of
Justice and Rep. Fitzgerald).
67 See Hon. Jeanine Ferris Pirro, Essay, Reforming the Urban Workplace: The
Legacy of Frances Perkins, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1423, 1424 (1999) (“Due to the
breadth and fundamental nature of Perkins’ changes to the urban work place, she
is, consequently, the most influential person to urban America in the twentieth
century.”). See generally KIRSTEN DOWNEY, THE WOMAN BEHIND THE NEW DEAL: THE
LIFE OF FRANCES PERKINS, FDR’S SECRETARY OF LABOR AND HIS MORAL CONSCIENCE
(2009) (discussing Perkins’s contributions to the New Deal).
68 FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 184 (statement of Frances Perkins, R
Secretary of Labor, Department of Labor).
69 Id. at 77.  For other government voices along these lines see FLSA, Hearing
Part 2, supra note 62, at 432 (statement of Anne S. Davis, Assistant Chief, Mini- R
mum Wage Division, Illinois State Department of Labor) (“I should like to see . . .
more definite mention made of industrial home work . . . and the powers given to
the Board to control it.  Large numbers of children have always been employed in
industrial home work . . . .”).
70 See, e.g., McComb v. Homeworkers’ Handicraft Coop., 176 F.2d 633,
638–39 (4th Cir. 1949) (explaining the significance of congressional intent for
homeworkers); Mitchell v. Nutter, 161 F. Supp. 799, 803–05 (D. Me. 1958) (same).
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During debates on the legislation late in 1937, legislators
expressed a similar sentiment about the method of payment,
rather than the location of work.  They feared that the FLSA’s
baseline wage and hour standards would not reach businesses
that paid workers based on the number of pieces that they
completed, rather than by the number of hours that they
worked.71  As Representative John Flannery (D-P.A.) noted,
pieceworkers “slave all day” in the factories and then “take
their material home to work on it all night.”72 Representatives
John Ridley Mitchell (D-Tenn.) and Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.)
argued that the exclusion of piecework workers from the FLSA
would lead to bad incentives.  Specifically, they expressed that
an exclusion would lead some employers to transform workers
that are currently salaried into piecework workers whose wages
did not meet minimum standards.73  As Representative Celler
put it in a succinct statement during the debates: “Do not the
proponents of this bill know that the failure to include piece
work within its provisions will induce many concerns in inter-
state commerce to avoid its provisions by putting its workers
on piece work?”74
Similarly, the debate about a proposal to exclude busi-
nesses that pay workers based on a commission basis75 illus-
trates a concern about how the formalities of business
arrangements might frustrate the enforcement of the Act.
Businesses often use commission-based payment systems to
increase worker activity.  Typically, a worker receives a com-
71 Representative Wilcox, for instance, claimed that “the worst labor condi-
tions” exist in industries where workers are paid on a piecework (rather than
hourly) basis. 82 CONG. REC. 1404 (1937) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox).  See
a similar statement by Representative Dies. Id. at 1388.
72 Id. at 1687.
73 Id. at 1689 (statement of Rep. John Ridley Mitchell) (“This measure is . . . a
dangerous experiment and un-Democratic in principle.  It will affect the prosper-
ity of the whole Nation. . . .  It will result in taking millions of jobs out of the
salaried class and put the worker on a production basis or piece work, and largely
destroy individual enterprise.”).
74 Id. at 1794 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (“The measure before us
does not include piece workers.  Do not the proponents of this bill know that the
failure to include piece work within its provisions will induce many concerns in
interstate commerce to avoid its provisions by putting its workers on piece
work?”).
75 81 CONG. REC. 7921 (1937) (statement of Sen. James Davis) (“My amend-
ment would exempt commission men or commission salesmen who are not work-
ing for any kind of wage or salary.  We know that the time of such a salesman is
his own.  He can work as he pleases.  He can work an hour or two in the morning
and then quit for the day.  He might make enough in 1 or 2 days to keep him for
months.  If such salesmen come within the terms of the bill, my amendment
would provide an exemption in their case.”).
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mission when he or she sells a specified amount of a product or
service, or receives the commission based on a percentage of
those sales.  Typically, if there are no sales, there is no commis-
sion.  Senator Robert M. La Follette Jr. (R-Wis.) voiced his op-
position to excluding businesses who use this practice this
way:
I am opposed to it lest it might provide a device whereby
employers could, through a commission arrangement, take
themselves out from under the terms of the bill. . . . What I
fear . . . is that through arrangements which may be made by
employers[,] persons who are not ordinarily working upon a
commission basis may be employed under such arrange-
ments when obviously they should be under the terms of the
bill.76
Other legislators similarly thought that excluding workers
paid through a commission arrangement would lead busi-
nesses to change how they paid their workers as means to
circumvent the Act’s coverage.  Senator Lewis Schwellenbach
(D-Wash.) stated that the commission exclusion and others of
its kind might foster “collusion between employers and employ-
ees and thus completely destroy the desired effect of the bill.”77
For Senator La Follette it was important that legislators be
“very careful” not to allow “employers who desire to defeat the
purposes of the bill [to] avail themselves of devices . . . which
will defeat the purposes” of the Act.78
76 Id. (statement of Sen. Robert La Follette) (“Mr. President, I am opposed to
the amendment submitted by [Mr. Davis].  I am opposed to it lest it might provide
a device whereby employers could, through a commission arrangement, take
themselves out from under the terms of the bill. . . . So far as persons who are
ordinarily hired upon a commission basis are concerned, I would have no objec-
tion to their being exempted from the provisions of the bill.  What I fear, however,
is that through arrangements which may be made by employers persons who are
not ordinarily working upon a commission basis may be employed under such
arrangements when obviously they should be under the terms of the bill.”).
77 Id. (statement of Sen. Lewis Schwellenbach) (“Would it not be possible
under the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania to bring about collusion
between employers and employees and thus completely destroy the desired effect
of the bill?”).
78 Id. (statement of Sen. Robert La Follette) (“That is what I fear. . . . We are
dealing here, however, with a situation affecting certain classes or kinds of em-
ployment which obviously should not come within the terms of the bill.  However,
as I stated yesterday in connection with an amendment offered by the Senator
from North Carolina [Mr. Reynolds], in adopting broad, sweeping exemptions
there is grave danger that means may be provided whereby employers who desire
to defeat the purposes of the bill may avail themselves of devices of that kind
under general exemption amendments.  I contend that the board has full power to
grant exemptions in cases of this nature, and therefore that in passing on the bill
we should be very careful and should reject amendments so sweeping in their
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The FLSA’s legislative history relating to off-premises work,
piecework, and commission-based payment arrangements re-
inforces the notion that the FLSA’s framers thought it was im-
portant to target these practices as covered by the legislation.
The impact of these types of arrangements is the very worker
experience legislators were aiming to address and rectify.  It
also shows that the FLSA’s framers foresaw that some busi-
nesses might change certain formalities such as where work is
located, or how pay arrangements are structured, in ways that
evaded coverage.
Congress eventually rejected this much-discussed list of
specified devices of evasion in favor of a much broader and
more flexible concept of employment.79  It provided definitions
that could adapt with the times and adapt to new “devices.”
The broad definition of “employ” that emerged in the final ver-
sion of this legislation extends the FLSA’s coverage to situa-
tions when businesses require or allow individuals to work and
have power over wages and hours, regardless of where the work
occurs, or how the worker is paid.80  It defines “employ” as “to
suffer or permit to work,” a phrasing it borrowed from state
child labor laws of the time.81
As Goldstein and his co-authors established in their com-
prehensive study of the roots of this definition, state child-labor
statutes used this language to ensure coverage of entities that
were in a position to know that children were performing work
and had the power to prevent that work.82  In a similarly broad
vein, the enacted legislation defines an employer as “any per-
son acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee.”83  Referring to this plain language and
the legislative history, courts overwhelmingly characterize the
nature that they may become a device which will defeat the purposes of the
proposed legislation.”).
79 See Reif, supra note 22, at 407–08 (citing literature and legislative history R
to conclude that “the suffer-or-permit-to-work language was inserted into the bill
which became the FLSA precisely to bring within the reach of the FLSA all means
for attempts at circumvention of the requirements of the Act, and one of those
means specifically identified by [6(a)]”).
80 United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945) (noting that a
“broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees within the stated catego-
ries would be difficult to frame”); Walling v. Am. Needlecrafts, Inc., 139 F.2d 60,
64 (6th Cir. 1943) (stating that “§ 6(a) . . . was eliminated in the Senate Committee
as giving too much discretionary power to the Board, the Committee asserting
. . . . the purpose of original [§] 6(a) was sufficiently served by the expanded
definition of the word ‘employ’ now incorporated as sub-section (g) of the Act”).
81 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018).
82 See Goldstein et al., supra note 46, at 1015–1102. R
83 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2018).
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FLSA’s definition of employment as “the broadest definition
that has ever been included in any one act.”84  Notably, the
definition explicitly uses the term “indirectly” in its characteri-
zation of which businesses are FLSA “employers.”
Congress’s ultimate decision to use expansive language to
describe the scope of employment covered by the Act, rather
than a specific list of tools of evasion, reflects a desire to protect
vastly the low-wage workforce, regardless of business structure
or formalities.85  It also signals an acute awareness that some
businesses may change form, or splinter off work, in ways that
avoid the FLSA’s reach.  The New Deal Congress that enacted
the FLSA intended it to reach to yet-to-be-seen business prac-
tices that may serve as unintended loopholes in the FLSA’s
minimum wage and overtime coverage.  Indeed, the aforemen-
tioned practice of industrial homework is an early form of
splintering off work from the central business.  By moving away
from a specific list of tools of evasion, Congress gestured that it
did not want to slide into an endless game of whack-a-mole, to
preempt different business structures and strategies that
might emerge to sidestep the FLSA’s coverage.  In this way, it is
fair to interpret the FLSA’s legislative history as strongly sug-
gesting that Congress aimed to ensure that under-regulated
aspects of the fissured business model did not take root in the
U.S. economy.
C. Rejecting Numerical Limits to Avoid Splintering
Beyond the tools already discussed, the legislative history
signaled congressional desire to nullify another method of eva-
sion that would frustrate the FLSA’s purposes.  Namely, Con-
gress considered and ultimately rejected proposals specifying
threshold limits on the number of employees.  This rejection, at
84 E.g., Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 363 n.3 (quoting the legislative history to
support its statement that “[a] broader or more comprehensive coverage of em-
ployees within the stated categories would be difficult to frame”); Lucas v. Jerusa-
lem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Because the FLSA by its plain
terms protects aliens working without authorization, the employers’ argument
must fail unless the employers can point to a different statutory basis for limiting
‘the broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act.’”).
85 Subsequent amendments to the definition of employer or employee have
not made relevant changes to these original concepts. See Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, 58–61 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (adding states as employers)); Fair Labor Stan-
dards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830, 831 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (expanding scope of “enterprise” coverage)). See
generally, Wage and Hour Division History, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR
DIVISION, https://www.dol.gov/whd/about/history/whdhist.htm [https://perma.
cc/QLZ5-5BXZ] (providing overview of all key amendments).
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least in part, related to concerns that businesses would splin-
ter off into smaller units to avoid coverage of the FLSA.  As
mentioned above, § 6(a) of the original proposed bill allowed a
Board to set a threshold number of employees, below which
businesses would not be covered (referred to for ease here as
the “numerical limits proposal”).  The legislation that Congress
ultimately enacted in June of 1938 did not include any numeri-
cal limits on the number of employees for purposes of the
FLSA’s coverage.  Instead, the statutory language reached all
businesses engaged in interstate commerce.86  As Forsythe’s
1939 seminal work on the FLSA’s legislative history described
when recounting the rejection of the numerical limits proposal,
Congress designed the legislation “to prevent evasion by cut-
ting large businesses into small units.”87  Thus, this section
describes another way that Congress sought to (a) broadly in-
clude businesses responsible for wages paid in relation to work
performed on their behalves and (b) reduce incentives for busi-
nesses to avoid statutory coverage by splintering (or, in Weil’s
terminology, by fissuring).
When Congress was conducting hearings on the numerical
limits proposal early in the lawmaking process,88 two impor-
tant figures in President Roosevelt’s administration empha-
sized the enforcement challenges these employee numerical
limits might pose.  U.S. Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins
described the proposed numerical limits on employees as an
“unwise” barometer for the FLSA’s coverage.89  Perkins, widely
acknowledged as the administrative architect of the FLSA,90
86 81 CONG. REC. 7651 (1937) (statement of Rep. Hugo Black) (“There was a
belief on the part of some members of the committee that there should be a
limitation.  There was a belief on the part of some members of the committee that
it should be three or five or eight or some other number.  However, the committee,
after consideration, included all businesses engaged in interstate commerce with-
out exempting employers who had less than a certain number of employees.”).
87 John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 484 n.114 (1939); see also Goldstein et al., supra note 46, R
at 1095 (citing id.).
88 Congress held extensive hearings on the original Black-Connery Bill.
Hearings were held on June 2-5, 7-9, 11, 14-15, and 21-22, 1937.
89 FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 184 (statement of Hon. Frances R
Perkins, Secretary of Labor, Department of Labor) (“I think it would be unwise to
exempt on the ground of a small number of employees.”); id. at 181 (“One of the
greatest difficulties to be overcome, if legislation of this character is to be success-
ful is that of enforcement. . . . I have grave doubt of the wisdom of including so
broad an exemption in the act as that contemplated by section 6 (a) which empow-
ers the Board to grant a blanket exemption to persons employing less than a
certain number of employees.”).
90 See Malamud, supra note 43, at 2286 (“In preparation for the seventy-fifth R
Congress, which met in January 1937, intense activity took place behind the
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stated during legislative hearings that numerical limits would
“encourage the formation of small units of persons employing
less than 20 or less than 15 persons.”91  In response to a sug-
gestion to lower the numerical limit to 8 or 10 employees, Per-
kins similarly responded that this limit “would tend to create
other small industries . . . .”92  Perkins and those supporting
her position wanted to ensure that the FLSA covered “the
sweatshop,” which she described as a small-scale “contractor
who takes work from a principal” and typically “hires other
people” to do the work.93  The business entities responsible for
a “sweatshop” subcontracting arrangement were precisely the
entities that Perkins and her colleagues intended the FLSA to
regulate.
Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson was the second
voice from the Roosevelt administration who disapproved of the
proposed idea to exclude some businesses based on the num-
ber of employees.  In a 1937 hearing, Jackson stressed that the
form a business is in, or the number of employees a business
has, should not be relevant to the FLSA’s enforcement reach.94
He expressed optimism that removing the numerical limits
would reduce enforcement headaches.95  Similar to Perkins,
Jackson noted that the numerical limits proposal would pro-
mote the splintering of businesses to circumvent coverage of
the FLSA.  He declared:
scenes in the Roosevelt administration (centering on Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins) and between Roosevelt and the chairmen of the House and Senate labor
committees.”). See generally DOWNEY, supra note 67 (elaborating the key role of R
Perkins).
91 FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 184 (statement of Hon. Frances R
Perkins, Secretary of Labor, Department of Labor). See also id. at 192 (another
law she has enforced with numerical limits “tended to prevent a man from taking
on additional employees that he might have taken on . . . so that he would not
have to come within the provisions of that law”).
92 Id. at 192 (statement of Rep. Reuben T. Wood).
93 Id. at 196–97; see also FLSA, Hearing Part 2, supra note 62, at 501 (state- R
ment of Reverend John A. Ryan) (“I agree with the Secretary of Labor in the
opinion that the employers of a small number of workers should not be excepted
from the provisions of the bill.  After all, it is among small employers that sweated
labor conditions are conspicuously prevalent.”).
94 Jackson stressed that the touchstone of the bill’s jurisdiction was “inter-
state commerce.” FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Robert R
H. Jackson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Department of Justice); see also id. at 7 (“Care
has been taken to hold the pending bill to a good faith regulation of interstate
commerce, and nothing more.”).
95 Id. at 71 (“[T]his law is not going to be so difficult to enforce as it looks on
the face of it, because I think when you get this thing started and it is found that
the Federal Government means business . . . then I think this law will enforce
itself much faster than you might think.”).
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[I]f you say that employers of less than 10 would be exempt,
some employers might try to split their business up to make
10 different employments, each employing 10, so as to avoid
regulation; and so it is necessary to have some flexibility in
that rule in order to avoid evasion of the [A]ct.96
Unsurprisingly, a group of large businesses and their advo-
cates voiced opposition to the numerical limits proposal
throughout the hearings on the legislation.97  These businesses
stood to lose out if the FLSA excluded small businesses.  In
their view, if the numerical limits proposal prevailed, small
businesses would gain an unfair economic advantage in the
marketplace.  A number of advocates for large businesses
stated in the FLSA’s hearings that the numerical limits were a
problem because they would inevitably promote “unfair compe-
tition”98 with smaller-scale businesses that, in their view, often
had the worst labor conditions.99  Some big-business voices
96 Id. at 49–50 (emphasis added).
97 See, e.g., id. at 254 (statement of R.C. Kuldell) (stating, as a manufacturer
of oil equipment, that all manufacturers in interstate commerce should be covered
“irrespective of the number of employees he employs”); FLSA, Hearing Part 2,
supra note 62, at 467 (1937) (statement of Professor Paul F. Brissenden, Millinery R
Manufacturing Industry) (resisting numerical limits); id. at 960 (statement of A.E.
Crockett, Manager, Industrial Management Council of Rochester) (same); id. at
603 (statement of Austin T. Levy, Stillwater Worsted Mills) (“If John Jones is being
underpaid or overworked, does the fact that he happens to be a member of a
group of 10 persons, instead of a group of 10,000, compensate for the underpay or
the overwork?”); id. at 589–90 (statement of Earl Constantine, National Associa-
tion of Hosiery Manufacturers) (“No one wants to appear as the enemy of . . . the
small . . . employer, but . . . I would like to urge a protest . . . against the
[numerical limits] . . . .  And this is not said as a friend of the big manufacturer as
against the small manufacturer.  We have both.”). Mid-sized businesses voiced
concern as well. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Part 3: Hearing on S. 2475
and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the H. Comm. on
Labor, 75th Cong. 1073 (1937) (statement of B.W. Stonebreaker, Southern Associ-
ation of Ornamental Metal Manufacturers) [hereinafter FLSA, Hearing Part 3].
98 FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 254 (referring to concern that ex- R
empting small businesses could “destroy the price structure”); FLSA, Hearing Part
2, supra note 62, at 526 (statement of Roy A. Cheney, Managing Director, Under- R
wear Institute) (“There should be no elimination of a small employer . . . it will
mean the transfer of the business from the larger mills to these small con-
cerns . . . .”); id. at 509 (statement of Harvey Willson, General Manager, National
Upholstery and Drapery Textile Association) (“In our industry there are just
enough small manufacturers with only a few employees . . . to constitute difficult
competition . . . .”); FLSA, Hearing Part 3, supra note 97, at 1002 (statement of R
Horace Herr, National League of Wholesale Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Distribu-
tors) (referring to consequence of “intolerable competitive conditions in this indus-
try”); id. at 1063 (statement of John H. Clippinger, President, S.H. Gerrard Co.)
(“[E]liminat[ing] the smaller operator . . . will . . . upset the whole wage structure.”).
99 FLSA, Hearing Part 3, supra note 97, at 1211–12  (letter of Clarence R. R
Bitting, Watch Hill, R.I.) (referring to “the establishment of sweatshop condi-
tions”); FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 134 (statement of  John G. Paine, R
Chairman of the Management Group, Council for Industrial Progress) (“[I]f the
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went so far as to critique the numerical limits proposal by
highlighting the incentives it created for large businesses to
splinter into small businesses to avoid coverage.  In this way,
these voices agreed with those who argued that numerical lim-
its would promote business fissuring.  They expressed distress
about the unfair competition that this would foster as some,
but not all, large businesses would splinter off part of the work
in an effort to evade the FLSA.  For example, a representative
from the National Lumber Manufacturers Association stated
during a hearing that if the numerical limits proposal went
through, business entities could avoid coverage of the Act “by
the easy device of contracting and subcontracting of both log-
ging and milling.”100  Another witness from the business sector
noted:
To escape the provisions of the proposed legislation . . . [some
businesses] might find it advantageous to break their opera-
tions into small units to be operated under some form of
contract or agreement with an individual employing one less
than the minimum number of employees to which the pro-
posed legislation would be applicable.101
After the hearings, Congressional debates on the legisla-
tion similarly illustrated a view that numerical limits would
encourage business splintering.  The numerical limits proposal
dropped out of the proposed bill’s language after the hearings.
During the debates, however, Senator Robert Rice Reynolds (D-
N.C.) offered an amendment and made a case for returning to a
numerical limit of ten employees.102  In offering his amend-
small groups are exempt they invariably develop a situation which gives them a
commercial advantage over other larger employers through the exploitation of
their labor. . . . We would like to see it all controlled, so that that commercial
advantage does not exist.  If there is to be an exemption we hope that that exemp-
tion will be low so as to cause the least amount of unfair competitive situations
existing in any one industry.”).  Some of the concern focused on the power of the
Board, rather than numerical limits as such. FLSA, Hearing Part 2, supra note
62, at 851–52 (statement of J.D. Battle, National Coal Association). (“It is safe to R
say that no past act of Congress has gone so far in delegating powers to a Federal
agency with so little definite limitation in the bill upon the use of powers, as is
found in the Fair Labor Standards Act . . .”); cf. id. at 314 (statement of Isador
Lubin, Comm’r of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor) (“I would like to point out
incidentally that both in the cotton textiles and in the silk and rayon it was not the
small firms that were always the great offenders. . . . You have good and bad
among the small just as you have among the big.”).
100 FLSA, Hearing Part 2, supra note 62, at 964 (statement of Dr. Wilson R
Compton, National Lumber Manufacturers Association).
101 FLSA, Hearing Part 3, supra note 97, at 1211 (letter of Clarence R. Bitting, R
Watch Hill, R.I.).
102 The numerical limits issue was a subject of debate on July 30, 1937,
because Reynolds offered an amendment (to S. 2475) that would limit the FLSA’s
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 29 27-JUN-19 9:06
2019] THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AT 80 585
ment, Senator Reynolds cited danger for the small sawmills,
grist mills, flour mills, and cannery operators in his home state
of North Carolina.103  Reynolds’s unease was indicative of a
more general, but minority, concern for small business inter-
ests evoked throughout the FLSA’s legislative process.104
Nonetheless, Senator Reynolds only received support for his
proposed amendment from a small group of senators,105 who
echoed concerns for small business interests that some repre-
sentatives had previously expressed.106  In response, some leg-
islators ameliorated worries about small business by pointing
out that because the FLSA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority, its jurisdictional reach could not
reach to entities with more than ten employees.  81 CONG. REC. 7863 (1937).
Though Reynolds’ numerical limit of ten amendments was initially agreed to on
July 30, 1937 via a viva-voce vote, id. at 7885, Senator Borah successfully entered
a motion to reconsider the viva-voce vote since his motion occurred within a two-
day limit to reconsider the vote. Id.  The amendment was subsequently reconsid-
ered and rejected by a roll call vote later the same day. Id. at 7888.  On July 31,
1937, Reynolds again offered an amendment, this time lowering the numerical
limit to 5.  At that time the Senate rejected it without debate and without calling it
to a vote. Id. at 7948.
103 Id. at 7863 (statement of Sen. Robert Reynolds) (“Mr. President, we have in
my State, as there are in other States, a large number of portable sawmills and
other small enterprises employing less than 10 men. There are flour mills and
grist mills, the products of which sometimes go into interstate commerce. There
are also small canneries employing 10 or fewer men, and in order that they may
be excluded from the provisions of the bill I have offered the amendment which
has just been read.”).
104 See, e.g., FLSA, Hearing Part 2, supra note 62, at 765 (statement of John E. R
Edgerton, President, Southern States Industrial Council) (“But if a bill such as the
one under consideration becomes a law, the South can look forward to the folding-
up and bankruptcy of innumerable small manufacturing enterprises which em-
ploy the majority of southern workers.”).
105 Senator Borah advocates for some numerical limit but noted that fixing a
number is difficult. 81 CONG. REC. 7864 (1937) (statement of Sen. William Borah)
(“Mr. President, in view of what the chairman of the committee has said, my
personal view is that, unless there is some exemption of those who employ a very
small number of persons, it will be practically impossible to administer this mea-
sure; but it is a frightful discrimination. My view of the bill would lead me to vote
for any provision that would limit the jurisdiction of this board; but this presents
the question of discrimination.”); see also id. at 7865 (“The difficulty I have in this
matter is in fixing the number.”).  Senator Logan similarly supported the amend-
ment, citing a concern for small businesses and the negative effect of promoting
big business monopolies. Id. at 7864–65 (statement of Sen. Marvel Logan).  Sena-
tor Byrnes similarly raised concerns about small business. Id. at 7943–44 (state-
ment of Sen. James Byrnes).
106 84 CONG. REC. 1394 (1937) (statement of Rep. Fred Hartley) (concerns for
small business); id. at 1665 (statement of Rep. Earl Michener) (same); id. (state-
ment of Rep. Stephen Pace) (same); id. at 1677 (statement of Rep. Paul Shafer)
(same); id. at 1689 (statement of Rep. John Rankin) (same); id. at 1794 (statement
of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (same); id. at 1831 (statement of Rep. Wade Kitchens)
(same); id. at 1832 (same); id. at 7424 (statement of Rep. Francis Case) (same); 85
CONG. REC. 7424 (1938) (statement of Rep. Francis Case) (same).
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(and thus would not) regulate small local businesses that were
not engaged in interstate commerce.107  The amendment’s fail-
ure meant that the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the
reach of the Commerce Clause would define the FLSA’s reach
to “small” businesses, regardless of the number of
employees.108
The debates around the numerical limits proposal show
that senators continued to discuss the concept of business
splintering and the consequent perpetuation of poor working
conditions and low wages in small subcontracted sweat-
shops.109  Senator David Walsh (D-Mass.), for instance, ex-
plained that the numerical limits proposal would create
incentives for businesses to break into multiple units to avoid
the FLSA’s coverage.110  He contended that if a numerical limit
of ten existed:
[T]he owners of the business will suddenly and unexpectedly
bring about a division of ownership, so that there will be 9
people in 10 different shops, and the legitimate, decent, and
respectable employer, who is willing to abide by the terms of
107 S. REP.  NO. 75-884, at 3 (1937) (“Although a goodly portion of the goods of
American industry move in interstate commerce and will be covered by the legisla-
tion which we recommend, there are many purely local pursuits and services
which no Federal legislation can effectively cover.”); H.R. REP. NO. 75-1452, at 9
(1937) (“It applies only to industries . . . directly affecting interstate commerce.  It
does not affect the purely local intrastate business”).
108 Marc Linder, The Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act: The “Original” Accumulation of Capital and the Inversion of Industrial
Policy, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 403, 493 (1998) (recounting floor debate leading up to the
vote and stating, “[f]ully aware that the exemption for firms with fewer than 10 or
fewer employees would have exempted a large proportion (more than one-half) of
the estimated universe of covered employers, employing only about one-twentieth
of all covered employees, the Senate, scarcely two months after the original bill
had been introduced, rejected the amendment by a vote of 52 to 31”).
109 81 CONG. REC. 7885 (1937) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (“Would not the
effect of the amendment be that the character of competition which we are seeking
to prevent, namely, exploitation as against efficiency, would continue, because
the small sweatshop, employing just a few persons, would continue to pay low
wages in competition with the employer who pays reasonable wages?”). Senator
Pat Harrison also expressed trepidation about the numerical limits proposal and
doubted the efficacy of the amendment and bill as a whole.  His concern was
unemployment.  As he stated during the debates, if ten is the limit, employers
with twelve employees would probably likely discharge two employees.  Even if the
face of uncertainty over how many small employers would do this, unemployment,
according to Senator Harrison, would likely grow if a numerical limit were set. Id.
at 7874 (statement of Sen. Pat Harrison).
110 During the debates, Senator Walsh expressed his support for the elimina-
tion of numerical limits by sharing an anecdote from the lumber mill industry.  He
recounted that the numerical limits would have encouraged more small business
to “go into the market in large numbers,” which would subject lumber mills “in
good standing” to “competition with chiselers and sweatshop operators” that were
not covered by the FLSA. Id. at 7651 (statement of Sen. David Walsh).
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this bill, and who employs 75 people will be penalized and be
the victim of chiseling by the employer who is in competition
with him and who seeks to evade the provisions of this bill, if
it shall be enacted.111
As the numerical limits aspect of the FLSA’s legislative his-
tory demonstrates, the FLSA’s framers predicted business
splintering and the challenges it may pose to the FLSA’s pur-
pose to provide broad minimum wage and overtime protections
to individuals at the lower end of the labor market.  Because of
predictions that businesses might have incentives to separate
into smaller units in an effort to avoid the FLSA’s coverage, the
legislation that resulted from this legislative process did not
apply only to businesses with more than a specified number of
employees.  Once again, we see that FLSA enforcement chal-
lenges relating to contemporary contracting and other forms of
business fissuring are not without historical precedent.  We
also see that Congress intended to restrict businesses, which
are responsible for work performed and are in a position to
influence wage payments, from avoiding coverage through fis-
suring, the formation of “controlled companies,” or the imple-
mentation of other kinds of business formalities.112
II
THE FLSA MOVING FORWARD: CONTRACTING AND
OTHER “FISSURING”
As the FLSA completes its eightieth year, the FLSA’s pur-
poses are as germane today as they were in the New Deal era.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
recently encapsulated the FLSA’s underlying policy and legisla-
tive history well:
Congress enacted the [FLSA] in 1938 in response to a na-
tional concern that the price of American development was
the exploitation of an entire class of low-income workers.
111 Id. at 7885 (statement of Sen. Walsh) (“Unfortunately, while I do not think
it is so intended by the Senator from North Carolina, the exemption proposed by
him will mean that in the great city of New York and in Boston and Chicago where
sweatshops are operated . . . the owners of the business will suddenly and unex-
pectedly bring about a division of ownership, so that there will be 9 people in 10
different shops, and the legitimate, decent, and respectable employer, who is
willing to abide by the terms of this bill, and who employs 75 people, will be
penalized and be the victim of chiseling by the employer who is in competition
with him and who seeks to evade the provisions of this bill, if it shall be enacted.”).
112 Businesses are responsible regardless of their intent to evade the Act. See
Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 145–47 (2d Cir. 2008)
(clarifying that a lack of intent to avoid legal obligations is not a safe haven from
legal obligations).
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President Roosevelt, who pushed for fair labor legislation,
famously declared: “The test of our progress is not whether
we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is
whether we provide enough for those who have too little.”
The FLSA thus safeguards workers from poverty by prevent-
ing employers from paying substandard wages in order to
compete with one another on the market.113
A comprehensive review of the FLSA’s legislative history por-
trays an acute awareness that business formalities can frus-
trate this purpose.  It shows a concerted effort to reduce
incentives for businesses to splinter, or “fissure,” in an effort to
avoid the FLSA’s grasp.  It also illuminates that the FLSA’s
framers presaged that businesses continuously evolve their or-
ganizational patterns and formal structures for a variety of
reasons.  Thus, it implores the FLSA’s enforcers, policymakers,
and adjudicators to interpret the notion of “employ,” and thus
the FLSA’s reach, broadly and adaptively in the twenty-first
century.
As this Part will elaborate, the message that the legislative
history communicates is that the FLSA’s regulatory power
should reach all businesses responsible, directly or indirectly,
for baseline wage standards, regardless of the forms those
businesses take, or of the self-serving formalities they im-
pose.114  The FLSA’s legislative history instructs that formali-
ties, like independent contractor labels, that businesses assign
to a relationship should not exclude true employment relation-
ships from the Act’s coverage.  It calls for continued adaptation
of the FLSA’s notion of “employ” to new organizational forms
and practices and for more consistency in joint employer and
independent contractor law.  If we are to presume anything, it
should be that the FLSA does apply to businesses engaged in
“new” trends in the low-wage economy, such as the growth in
contracting, subcontracting, licensing arrangements, and jobs
in the “online economy.”
113 Marsh v. J. Alexander’s LLC, 905 F.3d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(citing S.Rep. No. 93-690, at 4 (1974)).
114 See Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529,
1543–44 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (referring statutory pur-
poses and the suffer or permit language and stating that the “definition, written in
the passive, sweeps in almost any work done on the employer’s premises, poten-
tially any work done for the employer’s benefit or with the employer’s
acquiescence.”).
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A. Taking Seriously Indirect Influence
A key implication of this Article’s legislative history analy-
sis is that all three branches of government need to take indi-
rect influence over wages and hours more seriously.  Nothing in
the FLSA’s language or legislative history refers to the common
law notion of “control” as the touchstone of the FLSA’s scope.
Nonetheless, this subpart uses this term because the term
“control” is common in existing FLSA jurisprudence and the
contours of the contemporary debate.  The FLSA legislative his-
tory implores decision-makers who use the “control” lens in the
FLSA context to take seriously indirect forms of control.  To
date, there has been too much emphasis on direct forms of
control.
Discounting indirect forms of control erroneously pivots
the inquiry toward business formalities, which frustrates the
FLSA’s purposes.  The legislative history, especially with re-
spect to § 6(a), depicts that Congress intended to find employ-
ment relationships even when the relationship between the
lead company and front-line worker was indirect.  It listed in its
restrictions on “tools of evasion” the use of intermediaries such
as agents, independent contractors, and subsidiaries as de-
vices that would not absolve a lead company from ultimate
liability under the FLSA.  The discussion about this provision
persuasively signals that the FLSA’s framers intended to cover
entities whose only control was indirect.  In the final text of the
bill, this intent is further underscored by referring to indirect
control in the definition of “employer,” and by settling on the
broader “suffer or permit” language in the definition of
“employ.”
Thus, one takeaway from the FLSA’s legislative history is
that courts should take care not to overemphasize the impor-
tance of direct forms of control when determining whether a
business is an employer for FLSA purposes.  As mentioned, a
number of courts use a combination of factors in their employ-
ment tests that essentially require an entity to have formal or
direct control over the employees.115  The FLSA’s legislative his-
tory brings to light that courts are reading the FLSA far too
115 See, e.g., In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683
F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting the following factors for joint employment:
“(1) authority to hire and fire employees; (2) authority to promulgate work rules
and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation,
benefits, and hours; (3) day-to-day supervision, including employee discipline;
and (4) control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes, and the
like”).
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narrowly when they place too much emphasis on direct-control
factors such as whether a business directly controls payroll
and other types of employee records.  They read the FLSA’s
reach too restrictively when they focus their joint employer
analysis on whether the putative joint employer directly con-
trols hiring, specific work assignments, or work rules.116  These
considerations relate to business formalities.  The legislative
history shows that business formalities, like the mechanisms
some businesses use to determine pay (e.g., through a piece
rate or commission system), or the locations where the work is
performed (e.g., at homes), are mere formalities.
A business can be responsible for wage and hour practices
even though a separate business entity cuts the check for that
worker at the end of the week.  Courts considering whether an
entity is an employer should consider whether the business is
benefitting from the labor and has power, either directly or
indirectly, over the wages paid.  In this way, the legislative his-
tory is more in line with the Fourth Circuit’s recent characteri-
zation of the FLSA’s joint employer reach to businesses that
codetermine “informally” or “indirectly” the essential terms and
conditions of workers’ employment.117  It is consistent with
those federal courts that have utilized legal tests that require
an entity only to have functional or indirect forms of control
over the workers to achieve the status and responsibilities of an
“employer.”118  It also echoes the FLSA’s definition of “em-
116 For a court that takes this more narrow approach in the joint employer
context, see id.
117 Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir. 2017).
For critique, see COMM. ON EDUC. & WORKFORCE, supra note 37 (“Unfortunately, R
unelected NLRB bureaucrats, federal regulators, and activist judges have taken
steps to dramatically change what constitutes a ‘joint employer,’ creating uncer-
tainty for America’s job creators and entrepreneurs. . . . In January 2017, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted an expansive new joint employer
standard under the FLSA in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc.  The new test
finds joint employer status under the FLSA where ‘two or more persons or entities
are not completely disassociated . . .’ with respect to their separate workplaces.
The Fourth Circuit’s test seems to make any relationship or collaboration between
two businesses a joint employment relationship because the two entities will not
be completely disassociated.  To make matters worse, Salinas states that ‘one
factor alone can serve as the basis for finding that two or more . . . entities are “not
completely disassociated.”‘  This test is even broader than the joint employer test
under Browning-Ferris, and has contributed to a growing patchwork of joint em-
ployer standards across the country.”).
118 See, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The
factors . . . are (1) whether [the putative employer’s] premises and equipment were
used for the plaintiff’s work; (2) whether the Contractor Corporations had a busi-
ness that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer to another;
(3) the extent to which plaintiffs performed a discrete line-job that was integral to
[the putative employer’s] process of production; (4) whether responsibility under
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ployer,” which plainly uses the word “indirectly” to describe
which businesses are FLSA employers.
Furthermore, the FLSA’s legislative history provides an il-
luminating perspective for policymakers who are currently en-
gaged in efforts to change the FLSA’s definitions.  It shows that
any effort to narrow the FLSA’s coverage of employment rela-
tionships to “direct” relationships between parties flies in the
face of the central goals of the FLSA’s New Deal framers.  As
mentioned in the Introduction, the proposed Save Local Busi-
ness Act, H.R. 3441, would extend the FLSA’s responsibilities
only to businesses that have direct and significant control “over
essential terms and conditions of employment,” like hiring, fir-
ing, and determining pay.119  Pro-business interests, mostly
prompted by the National Labor Relations Board’s Browning-
Ferris joint-employer decision,120 refer to current developments
in joint employer law as causing “harm” to the franchise system
of organizing businesses,121 and to construction companies
the contracts could pass from one subcontractor to another without material
changes; (5) the degree to which the [putative employer] or their agents supervised
plaintiffs’ work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or predominantly for
the [putative employer].”); see also Salinas, 848 F. 3d at 141 (listing the Fourth
Circuit’s factors for determining who is a joint employer).
119 Save Local Business Act, H.R. 3441, 115th Cong. § 2(a)(B) (2017) (“ ‘A per-
son may be considered a joint employer in relation to an employee only if such
person directly, actually, and immediately, and not in a limited and routine man-
ner, exercises significant control over essential terms and conditions of employ-
ment, such as hiring employees, discharging employees, determining individual
employee rates of pay and benefits, day-to-day supervision of employees, as-
signing individual work schedules, positions, and tasks, or administering em-
ployee discipline.”).  Rep. Bradley Byrne (R-AL) introduced H.R. 3441 in the House
of Representatives on July 27, 2017.  The same day, Congress referred it to the
House Committee on Education and the Workforce.  On September 13, 2017, the
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections and the Subcommittee on Health, Em-
ployment, Labor, and Pensions held hearings on the bill.  On November 7, 2017,
the House passed the bill with a vote of 242–181. The Senate received H.R. 3441
on November 8, 2017.  The Senate has not yet taken further action on the bill.
120 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015).
121 John T. Bender, Barking Up the Wrong Tree: The NLRB’s Joint-Employer
Standard and the Case for Preserving the Formalities of Business Format Franchis-
ing, 35 FRANCHISE L.J. 209, 233–35 (2015) (“The standards proposed by the [Office
of General Counsel] and adopted by the Board in Browning-Ferris pose a substan-
tial risk of fundamentally altering the business of franchising.”); David L. Stein-
berg et al., Uncertainty Abounds: The Joint Employer Doctrine and the Franchise
Business Model, 96 MICH. BAR J. 26, 28 (2017) (“Direct and indirect control im-
posed by the franchisor over employment matters is not what either party desires
and is contrary to the entire franchise business model of establishing businesses
owned and operated by independent entities.  It is not an overreaction to say that
the general public will be the loser if some franchises are regulated out of busi-
ness.”); COMM. ON EDUC. & WORKFORCE, supra note 37 (“Small business owners R
may have less freedom to operate their businesses.  If a franchisor is responsible
for the employment decisions of its franchisees, the franchisor will have no choice
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and other industries that rely on contracting.122  In contrast,
others, often citing the historically expansive reach of the
FLSA, refer to the Save Local Business Act as “radical” and as
rolling back century-old protections for low-wage workers.123
The FLSA’s legislative history supports this latter notion.  Con-
cerns about effects on how businesses organize themselves
notwithstanding, a business’s use of formalities that insulate it
from direct forms of control was not, is not, and should not be
but to exert greater control over the franchise small business.  Fewer individuals
will have the opportunity to own their own business.  Concerns have been raised
that the new joint employer standard will upend successful business models that
have empowered countless Americans to achieve the American Dream of owning a
business.  There are also concerns that employers will be discouraged from con-
tracting with small businesses for various services.  Higher costs for consumers
and fewer jobs for workers.  If a franchisor is suddenly responsible for managing
the daily operations of its franchisees, the franchisor will face higher administra-
tive costs that will be passed onto the franchisee and ultimately result in higher
prices for consumers or fewer jobs for workers.  According to the American Action
Forum, the new joint employer standard could result in 1.7 million fewer jobs.”).
122 Letter from Competitive Enterprise Institute to Congress (Oct. 3, 2017).  In
another letter supporting passage of H.R. 3441, dated October 3, 2017, a joint
employer coalition, including the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council,
wrote “This bill . . . is urgent and necessary to fix a problem—caused by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)—that is negatively impacting countless
small businesses and their employees nationwide. . . .  Employers that have
contractual arrangements with franchisees and other small businesses could be
forced to take greater control of their operations to mitigate the nearly unlimited
liability to which the new joint employer standard could expose them.”  Letter
from Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council to House of Representatives
(Oct. 3, 2017).  In a letter dated February 14, 2017, the Small Business and
Entrepreneurship Council, undersigned by employer and business trade associa-
tions such as the National Federation of Independent Business and the National
Franchisee Association, wrote of the joint employment standard and the FLSA: “In
the months since August 2015, joint employer lawsuits have been brought prima-
rily under the FLSA . . . .  The joint employment jeopardy created by the NLRB is
reaching all levels of business from franchise employers to construction compa-
nies to service providers and their business partners.  The unlimited joint em-
ployer liability standard will continue to harm businesses in numerous industries
under multiple federal and state statutes until Congress enacts a permanent,
legislative solution . . . .”  Letter from Small Business and Entrepreneurship
Council to House of Representatives (Feb. 14, 2017).
123 Lynn Rhinehart, A Radical Republican Proposal to Roll Back Worker Protec-
tions, HILL, (Sept. 19, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/labor/
351249-a-radical-republican-proposal-to-roll-back-worker-protections [https://
perma.cc/B2T3-5J78] (“In fact, as a practical matter the legislation would elimi-
nate joint employment under . . . the Fair Labor Standards Act.  This would make
it easier for employers to cheat workers out of their wages . . . .  It is radical, far-
reaching legislation that would roll back worker protections.  The bill establishes
a whole new definition of ‘joint employer’ that is far narrower than agencies,
courts and the common law have ever used.  It would reverse decades of precedent
and weaken worker protections established by Congress in the 1930s under the
Fair Labor Standards Act . . . .”).
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relevant when it comes to the FLSA’s reach.  The FLSA reaches
the practice, not the form.
In sum, the FLSA’s legislative history dictates forcefully
that the statute must reach even those entities that benefit
from the labor and have indirect power over the payment of
minimum wage and overtime premiums, regardless of formali-
ties.  This is sound policy.  The FLSA broadly holds responsible
companies that require or allow work on their behalf, regard-
less of the label businesses put on the work, the business
structure, the methods of pay, or the location of the work.  As
Professor Michael Harper puts it, the proposed Save Local Bus-
iness Act would mean that “employers could escape liability for
wage and hour violations . . . for which they have primary
responsibility.”124  Because the new language would require
“significant control,” some businesses would simply use indi-
rect means to control wage practices related to the employees of
the subordinate businesses they work with.125  Moreover,
Harper rightfully warns that the new language “could lead to
greater misclassification of some employees as independent
contractors.”126  As the discussion above illustrates, if Con-
124 Michael C. Harper, The Restatement of Employment Law’s ‘Independent
Business Person-Entrepreneurial Control’ Test for Employee Status, in WHO IS AN
EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 20, at 45. R
125 Post-hearing Questions for the Record from Ranking Member Bobby Scott:
Redefining Joint Employer Standards: Barriers to Job Creation and Entrepreneur-
ship, 115 Cong. 2–3 (2017) (“First, employers could escape liability for wage and
hour violations as well as unfair labor practices for which they have primary
responsibility.  H.R. 3441 would require that to be considered a joint employer, a
person must ‘directly, actually, and immediately, and not in a limited and routine
manner, exercise [ ] significant control over the essential terms and conditions of
employment.’  This easily could be interpreted to exclude employers that cause
illegal practices by inducing independent but subordinate other employers to
engage in illegal practices, perhaps by exercising control over managers employed
by the subordinate employers.  Furthermore, the requirement that ‘significant
control’ over ‘rates of pay’ and ‘work schedules’ be the rates or schedules of
‘individual’ employees could mean that a controlling employer could set illegal pay
and work schedules as long as it did not assign individuals to particular slots in
the schedules.”).
126 Id. (“[P]assage of H.R. 3441 would have the perhaps unintended conse-
quence of confusing the law governing the definition of single as well as joint
employment relationships.  This confusion could lead to the greater misclassifica-
tion of some employees as independent contractors.  The Supreme Court has
directed that the common law definition of employee should govern the scope of
federal employment law statutes.  This common law definition reflects the wisdom
of generations of judicial decisions.  Using undefined and ambiguous words such
as ‘directly, actually, and immediately’ and ‘limited and routine’ and ‘significant’,
H.R. 3441 offers governing language to depart from the common law in an uncer-
tain manner.  Furthermore, the inclusion of this language in the definitions of
employer in the NLRA and the FLSA may be interpreted by the courts to express
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gress passes this legislation it would be in direct contradiction
to the purposes of the FLSA’s New Deal framers to broadly
protect low-wage workers.  Through formalities that foster indi-
rect linkages between the workers and the lead company, some
businesses, which should be responsible for the payment of
wages in the low-wage economy, would find themselves outside
of the FLSA’s domain.
B. Disregarding Business’ Self-Serving Labels
In a similar vein to the above, the FLSA’s legislative history
compellingly portrays that businesses’ self-serving labels and
contractual terms are not relevant to the FLSA’s reach.  This is
a key observation in the contemporary context given that mis-
classification of true employees as “independent contractors” is
widespread in the low-wage economy.127  The Congress that
enacted the FLSA feared that business formalities would unin-
tentionally push some businesses out of the FLSA’s regulatory
zone.  Thus, the mere labeling, or existence of a contractual
term indicating that a worker is an “independent contractor,”
carries no weight in the determination of whether a FLSA-rec-
ognized employment relationship exists.128  New Deal legisla-
tors and administrators, for instance, interrogated the use of
self-serving devices like off-premises work, piecework, or com-
mission payment arrangements.  Courts, and administrators,
are too often relying on labels and business formalities despite
this history and the broad language of the FLSA.
A recent federal district court case serves as an example of
this failing.  The court did not consider congressional intent as
expressed in the FLSA’s legislative history.129  Instead, the
court considered the business’ self-serving formalities as rele-
vant to employment determinations under the FLSA.  The case
involved Uber’s luxury service, called UberBLACK.  The court
concluded, on summary judgment motion, that UberBLACK
drivers were not FLSA employees of Uber as a matter of law.
The court stated that the facts “weigh[ ] heavily in favor of ‘inde-
Congressional intent that if no individual employer can meet the more rigorous
standard, the worker should be treated as an independent contractor, even in
cases where the employers together exercise sufficient control to deny the worker
the discretion of an independent contractor.”).
127 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. R
128 See Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988)
(“Though an employer’s self-serving label of workers as independent contractors
is not controlling, an employer’s admission that his workers are employees cov-
ered by the FLSA is highly probative.” (citations omitted)).
129 Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., Civ. No. 16-573, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230,
at *19–21 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (omitting any mention of legislative history).
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pendent contractor’ status.”130  It placed too much emphasis
on contractual terms in general, especially with respect to self-
serving terms that disavowed control.  Indeed, the considera-
tion the court elaborated upon “at the outset” was Uber’s “lack
of control,” exhibited in “the written agreements.”131  It noted
that the black letter of the written agreements stated that Uber
does not control drivers, that Uber did not dictate when drivers
needed to be on the app, and that Uber did not require drivers
to use Uber logos or particular colors on their vehicles.
While the court’s analysis widely embraced the formalities
in the agreements that showed less control, it all but ignored
the formalities that suggested more control.  The written agree-
ments explicitly gave Uber power to deactivate drivers, to
“block” certain drivers from a line “at major transportation
hubs,” to reduce the number of hours a driver may work con-
secutively, and to make deductions from a driver’s earnings.132
The court acknowledged that Uber does have substantial con-
trol over the drivers “when they are online with the Uber app,”
but found it relevant that the drivers decide when to turn the
app on (when to work), that the workers are formally allowed to
work for other companies, and that drivers can hire “help-
ers.”133  Acknowledging that Uber had deactivated one of the
driver-plaintiffs for driving while he was intoxicated, the court
concluded that this “does not suggest ‘control’” over the
driver’s working conditions and instead related this to “a sense
of responsibility for the safety” of the passengers.134
Given the FLSA legislative history analysis developed here,
courts should not be dismissing these kinds of cases on sum-
mary judgment motions to dismiss.  They should not be relying
on self-serving formalities, such as the written agreement be-
130 Id. at *44.
131 Id. at *38–39  (“At the outset, the Court notes that the written agreements
entered into by the Plaintiffs and their transportation companies point to a lack of
control by Uber.  For example, the Services Agreement states, ‘Uber does not, and
shall not be deemed to, direct or control Customer or its Drivers generally or in
their performance under this Agreement.’  (Uber SOF ¶ 22).  These agreements,
however, go beyond merely characterizing the extent to which Uber can control
drivers.  They also specifically detail the many ways that Uber is not entitled to
control UberBLACK drivers.  (See, e.g., id. (‘Customer and its Drivers retain the
sole right to determine when, where, and for how long each of them will utilize the
Driver App or the Uber Services’; ‘Uber shall have no right to require Customer or
any Driver to [ ] display Uber’s or any of its Affiliates’ names, logos or colors on any
Vehicle(s)[,] or [ ] wear a uniform or any other clothing displaying Uber’s or any of
its Affiliates’ names, logos or colors.’)).”).
132 Id. at *39–40.
133 Id. at *39–42.
134 Id. at *42.
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tween Uber and its UberBLACK drivers.135  These cases, which
admittedly do present new sets of factual circumstances given
innovations in technology, at minimum call for a full review of
the record beyond self-serving labels or contractual terms,
rather than outright dismissals on summary judgment.  The
district court in the UberBLACK case put an outsized burden
on the plaintiff drivers that is out of step with the FLSA’s pur-
poses.  Its holding goes against the overwhelming thrust of the
legislative history’s message to read independent-contractor
exclusions extremely narrowly.
C. Encouraging Adaptations in the Twenty-First Century
Courts, policymakers, and administrators need to pick up
the calls for continued adaptation to hold true to the FLSA’s
purposes in the twenty-first century.  The FLSA’s framers fore-
saw that the types of formalities associated with business orga-
nizational practices would shift over time.136  They predicted
that splintering, or “fissuring,” would continue to be an en-
forcement challenge.  They intended to reduce incentives for
splintering that was motivated by an effort to evade wage and
hour responsibilities.  Indeed, a major reason that Congress
removed an exclusion for small businesses that did not reach a
threshold number of employees was a concern that some busi-
nesses would break off parts of themselves to fall outside of the
Act’s influence.  By opting for broad and adaptable language,
congressional representatives sought to cover off-premises
work, misclassification of independent contractors, piecework
arrangements, splintered-off business forms, and other prac-
tices that sidestepped the FLSA’s reach.  They wanted to reduce
the incentives for businesses to engage in “unfair competition”
by paying workers below the FLSA’s baseline standards.
These historical lessons call for creative adaptation in the
twenty-first century.  The history urges critical consideration of
“fissured” or splintered employment arrangements in the
twenty-first century, which some courts have already started to
135 Contracts, and other formalities, however can indicate control over an
employee.  When they are not self-serving they can show a business’ power over
an individual’s work life.  In Hall v. DIRECTV, for instance, the court found a
contractual arrangement relevant, stating that DIRECTV mandated that plaintiff
workers “obtain their work schedules and job assignment through DIRECTV’s
centralized system” and that they use “particularized methods and standards of
installation.”  Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 772 (4th Cir. 2017).
136 See supra subpart I.C & Part II.
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do explicitly.137  It invites policymakers to think about the ex-
tent to which contemporary splintering is motivated by evasion
of wage-and-hour-law requirements and what the law can do
moving forward to hold true to the FLSA’s purposes.  It compels
creative thinking about how new “devices” of twenty-first cen-
tury technology apply in the FLSA context.  Tippett, Alexander,
and Eigen recently made precisely this type of recommendation
to the U.S. Department of Labor.138  They specified the kinds of
wage and hour violations that result from a business’s use of
particular software for payroll and timekeeping and then cre-
atively recommended such things as enhanced data trans-
parency and the prohibition of “rounding” when calculating
hours of work.139  The FLSA was built for just this kind of
adaptation to new business trends, with an eye toward its ulti-
mate purposes to hold a floor on the low-wage labor market.  It
allows and invites its enforcers to innovate the regulatory ma-
chinery when necessary to accommodate economic and tech-
nological change.  In the long run, what is important in these
adaptations is that courts and administrators consider the
FLSA’s broad remedial purposes to provide blanket wage pro-
tections for the low-wage workforce in the United States.
D. Calling for a Blanket, Rather than Swiss-Cheese
Touchstone
The FLSA’s legislative history shows how much promise
the legislation has to serve as a safeguard for the bottom of the
labor market.  The current unpredictable state of joint em-
ployer and independent contractor law is a problem that needs
remedying.  It creates loopholes for businesses and unpredict-
ability for all parties involved.  We need the FLSA to be more
like a blanket, and less like Swiss cheese.  If there were too
many holes in coverage, the FLSA’s framers knew that some
businesses would quickly find ways to squeeze through them.
Yet, the DOL’s and the courts’ inconsistent enforcement of the
FLSA in independent contractor and joint-employer cases has
137 See Hall, 846 F.3d at 772 (referring to the plaintiff’s allegation that defen-
dant DIRECTV “operated a fissured employment scheme, governed by a web of
provider agreements, that endured throughout Plaintiffs’ periods of employment
as DIRECTV technicians and was essential to the installation and repair of
DIRECTV’s own products.  DIRECTV was the principal—and, in many cases,
only—client of the lower-level subcontractors, and DIRECTV often infused capital
into or formally ‘absorb[ed]’ the subcontractors when necessary.”).
138 Elizabeth Tippett, Charlotte S. Alexander & Zev J. Eigen, When Timekeep-
ing Software Undermines Compliance, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 55–61 (2017).
139 Id. at 55, 60–61.
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created holes in coverage.  As Congress predicted in the 1930s,
many businesses are trying to fit through these holes.  We need
an identifiable touchstone, or some type of easy-to-apply pre-
sumption of employment status, if we are to reduce this incon-
sistency and achieve the FLSA’s purposes.
The most recent example of the unpredictability that
plagues these areas of FLSA law was the interpretive guidance
provided by the DOL’s Wage and Hour Administrator on both
independent contractor law and joint employer law.  The Ad-
ministrator issued the guidance in 2015 and 2016 under Presi-
dent Obama’s administration, but subsequently rescinded the
guidance in 2017 under President Trump’s administration.140
President Obama’s DOL made it a priority to target businesses
engaged in independent contractor misclassification.  It recov-
ered almost $80 million for employees in misclassification
cases involving construction, hospitality and other low-wage
industries.141  In 2015 alone, the DOL Wage and Hour Division
recovered over $23 million in unpaid minimum wages and
overtime premiums on behalf of FLSA-covered employees.142
In contrast, given the rescission of the Obama-era administra-
tive guidance, it is highly unlikely that President Trump’s DOL
will make independent contractor misclassification enforce-
ment a top priority.143
140 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpre-
tation No. 2015-1 (July 15, 2015) (the Obama Administration’s guidance regard-
ing independent contractors); see also U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2016-1 (Jan. 20, 2016) (the Obama Adminis-
tration’s guidance regarding joint employment). But see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, US Secretary of Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, Independent Con-
tractor Informal Guide (June 7, 2017) (the Trump Administration’s recent removal
of this guidance).  Congress has attempted to weigh in as well. See Save Local
Business Act, H.R. 3441, 115th Cong. (2017) (noting a Congressional attempt to
clarify joint employment).
141 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, California Court Rulings Send Clear
Message to Employers Who Misclassify Workers as ‘Independent Contractors’
(Aug. 19, 2015) (noting that in 2014, the Wage and Hour Division recovered over
$79 million for workers in low-wage industries).
142 David Weil, Strategic Enforcement in the Fissured Workplace, in WHO IS AN
EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 20, at 19; see Press Release, U.S. R
Dep’t of Labor, Halliburton Pays Nearly $18.3 million in Overtime Owed to More
Than 1,000 Employees Nationwide after US Labor Department Investigation
(Sept. 22, 2015); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, California Court
Rulings Send Clear Message to Employers Who Misclassify Workers as ‘Indepen-
dent Contractors’ (Aug. 19, 2015) (detailing a court judgment requiring $5 million
to be paid to misclassified courier drivers).
143 See, e.g., Carmen N. Couden & Scott T. Allen, United States: Top Labor And
Employment Issues In Automotive To Watch In 2018, MONDAQ (Feb. 5, 2018), http:/
/www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/670544/employeerights+labourrelations/
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 43 27-JUN-19 9:06
2019] THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AT 80 599
Administrators and courts struggle to identify a touch-
stone in these cases that would lead to more consistency and
predictability.  Generally speaking, decision-makers often list a
number of legal “factors,” state that they are looking at the
“totality of the circumstances,” that no one factor is dispositive,
and that the overarching inquiry is the “economic realities” of
the situation, but the ultimate touchstone is difficult to parse.
It is common for courts to translate the touchstone as an ulti-
mate question of whether the worker is economically depen-
dent on a business.144  If the answer is yes, the worker is an
“employee” of that business.  But, what does “economic depen-
dence” mean in the twenty-first century U.S. economy?  Here,
the Article begins to flesh out some answers, but it is beyond
the scope of the Article to comprehensively synthesize all
proposals.
In the independent contractor area, the Restatement Third
of Employment Law provides a helpful framework for grounding
multi-factored tests and making sense of the economic depen-
dence touchstone.145  While it is intended to apply more
broadly than the FLSA, once applied to the FLSA it could help
to decipher true economic dependence in the FLSA context.  Its
framing cautions that the “independent contractor” distinction
should apply only to an individual who is truly in business for
himself or herself.  It should apply narrowly.  True independent
contractors, unlike FLSA employees, have the freedom to make
“important” labor and capital allocation decisions in their own
interests.  Professor Michael Harper, reporter and author of
this section of the Restatement Third, refers to its touchstone
as the “independent business person entrepreneurial control
test.”146  Harper acknowledges that the FLSA’s definition of em-
ployment is uniquely broader than the definitions included in
other employment and labor statutes.147  He notes, however,
that despite this broad definition, courts often mistakenly de-
Top+Labor+And+Employment+Issues+In+Automotive+To+Watch+In+2018 [https:
//perma.cc/6NKF-WS8F] (discussing labor issues under the Trump
administration).
144 Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (“I]n the application of
social legislation employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are
dependent upon the business to which they render service.”).
145 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
146 See Harper, supra note 124, at 45–55. R
147 Id. at 49.  The Court has often remarked that with the FLSA Congress used
broad language to include relationships as “working relationships” that wouldn’t
have been found to be employer-employee relationships under common law right-
to-control standards. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729
(1947).
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fault into the narrower common law control criteria in cases
involving the FLSA.148  The Restatement Third brings more clar-
ity to the notion of economic dependence by implicitly defining
economically dependent employees as people who do not make
important labor and capital allocation decisions in their own
interests.
Applying this touchstone to a recent FLSA case involving
an alleged independent contractor brings additional perspec-
tive on this distinction.  In that case, a federal district court did
not follow the Restatement Third’s guidance or the broad and
adaptable definitions of employment that pervade the FLSA’s
language and legislative history.149  Instead, the court signaled
that low-wage plaintiff car washers, who worked for a single
car-wash business, may indeed be independent contractors in
business for themselves.150  In that case, the district court
judge concluded that the car washers might not be entitled to
the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime protections if they
have some control over their schedules and have some oppor-
tunities to solicit their own clients.151  Based on the facts
presented on the motion for summary judgment, if the car
washer plaintiffs were efficient and finished their specified
work for the day early, the car wash would allow them to solicit
their own clients to make some extra money.152  Denying the
motion for summary judgment on the question of the car wash-
ers’ status as FLSA employees, the court found that this oppor-
tunity to gain their own profits could be a strong indicator of an
independent business.153  In the court’s words, if the car wash
allowed this it would mean that the workers “had opportunities
for judgment-driven performance and could realize gains from
their greater efficiency.”154
Given the FLSA legislative history analysis and the Restate-
ment Third’s formulation, however, courts should find eco-
148 Harper, supra note 124, at 47–49; see also Alberty-Velez v. Corporacio´n de R
Puerto Rico Para La Difusio´n Pu´blica, 361 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2004) (television
host was presumed to be an independent contractor); Speen v. Crown Clothing
Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 638 (1st Cir. 1996) (burden on sales representative to prove
that he was not an independent contractor).
149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
150 Rounds v. Phil’s Kar Kare, No. 16-13170, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30170, at
*10–11 (E.D. Mi. Feb. 26, 2018); Lawrence E. Dube, Car Washers May Be Inde-
pendent Contractors, Court Decides, DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://
bnanews.bna.com/daily-labor-report/car-washers-may-be-independent-contrac
tors-court-decides [https://perma.cc/6F5W-LZR8].
151 Rounds, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30170, at *13–22.
152 Id. at *18–19.
153 Id. at *15–16.
154 Id. at *16.
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nomic dependence and thus employee status based on these
kinds of facts; cases involving low-wage workers who work pri-
marily for one company and have little discretion over the ma-
jority of their work, or work under the direction of a business,
should come out the other way.155  The low-wage car washers
used the car wash’s tools, location, and materials for the solici-
tation of extra work, were only allowed to do this after they
completed their primary work for the car wash, and did not
have a separate business entity.  Allowing workers to solicit
their own business only after they finished their required work
is simply not the mark of an individual who is truly in business
for herself or himself.  If the car washers could alter how the
majority of work is done during the workday, or over how to
invest capital in the car wash’s future, that would be different.
Soliciting business at the end of a shift if, and only if, they work
fast does not constitute control over important capital alloca-
tion decisions.156
The legislative history analysis counsels that, in cases in-
volving these kinds of undisputed economic-dependency re-
lated facts, federal courts should find that low-wage car wash
workers are not independent contractors as a matter of law.
Judge Easterbrook, in a concurring opinion, made an argu-
ment along these lines in a FLSA case involving a question of
whether low-wage migrant farmworkers were “independent
contractors” of a cucumber farmer.  According to Easterbrook,
“migrant farm hands” should be considered employees of the
farmer as a rule of decision.  He argued that this would be
consistent with the FLSA’s purposes and would provide the
parties with more predictability.  As he puts it, “Why keep cu-
cumber farmers in the dark about the legal consequences of
their deeds?”157  In Easterbrook’s view, there are hard indepen-
dent contractor cases, but “this is not one of them.”158  To
crystallize the point, he stated, “migrant workers are selling
nothing but their labor.  They have no physical capital and little
human capital to vend.”159  Simply put, if courts and the DOL
155 For a view along these lines, see Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v.
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(calling for a presumption that farmworkers are not “independent contractors”
and stating that “the statute was designed to protect worker without substantial
human capital, who therefore earn the lowest wages. No one doubts that migrant
farm workers are short on human capital”).
156 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
2015).
157 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1539 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 1545.
159 Id.
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embrace the historical legacies of the FLSA, and the concomi-
tant Restatement Third’s touchstone, independent contractor
law would be more consistent and predictable because the in-
dependent contractor exception would be used sparingly.  It
would, thus, move us closer to avoiding the pitfalls of “various
unstructured, multifactored tests”160 and attaining blanket-
like coverage for low-wage workers.
In subcontracting joint-employer cases, and cases involv-
ing multiple business entities, the economic dependence
touchstone needs further specification as well.  In cases where
the worker is an “employee,” and the question is “whom” is his
or her “employer,” the analysis no longer turns on whether the
employee makes important labor and capital allocation deci-
sions.  The question is on whom (which business or busi-
nesses) is the employee economically dependent.  Scholars and
some courts161 have called for deeper consideration of the early
child labor cases, from which the broad “suffer or permit” lan-
guage emerged.  Drawing from a review of this extensive his-
tory, Goldstein et al. argue that economic dependence is met
when a business knew or had reason to know that work was
performed and the business was in a position to prevent the
harm.162  This interpretation is consistent with the FLSA’s
broad language, remedial purposes, and legislative history
presented here.  As the Supreme Court has noted, the FLSA’s
definitions have “striking breadth” that “stretches” beyond
“traditional agency law principles.”163  Along similar lines, Pro-
160 See Harper, supra note 124, at 45.  FLSA independent contractor cases R
have varied results. Compare McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm’t, LLC, 825 F.3d 235,
240 (4th Cir. 2016) (exotic dancers were employees), and Castillo v. Givens, 704
F.2d 181, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (farmworkers were employees), and McComb v.
Homeworkers’ Handicraft Coop., 176 F.2d 633, 635 (4th Cir. 1949) (piecework
home workers were employees), and W. Union Tel. Co. v. McComb, 165 F.2d
65,73 (6th Cir. 1947) (agents were employees), with Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp.,
Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 149 (2d Cir. 2017) (drivers were independent contractors), and
Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp. 102 F.3d 625, 634 (1st Cir. 1996) (sales represen-
tative was an independent contractor), and Lodge 1858, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.
v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (technical service workers at NASA
were independent contractors).
161 See, e.g., Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 21
(Cal. 2018) (“Courts applying such statutes before 1916 had imposed liability, for
example, on a manufacturer for industrial injuries suffered by a boy hired by his
father to oil machinery, and on a mining company for injuries to a boy paid by coal
miners to carry water.”).
162 See Goldstein et al., supra note 46, at 1037, 1041, 1043, 1048.  Some R
scholars go even further and argue for strict liability. See Glynn, supra note 12, at R
227–28 (arguing that if a business buys, sells, or distributes goods or services it
should be held strictly liable for any wage and hour abuses that occur related to
those goods or services).
163 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326–27 (1992).
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fessor James Reif formulated a test that would hold lead com-
panies liable when the work performed by front-line workers is
“integral” to the company’s mission, the company “knew or had
reason to know” of the work performed, and the company had
the ability to remedy the problem but did not.164  These
broader, more blanketing theories of employment in the FLSA
context could help courts and administrators to make more
sense of the outer limits of the “economic dependence” touch-
stone.  The legislative history communicates that if a business
allows work to be performed, is the ultimate beneficiary of that
work, and has the power to affect wages and hours, that entity
is an employer.
CONCLUSION
In 1937, U.S. Labor Secretary Frances Perkins stressed to
the legislators voting on the FLSA that overcoming challenges
to effective enforcement would be key to the FLSA’s success.165
U.S. Assistant Attorney General Jackson stressed the impor-
tance of focusing on “practices” of businesses, rather than bus-
iness form.  These observations still ring true today.  The
increased prevalence of many forms of contracting, subcon-
tracting, and outsourcing, or what Weil and others call “fissur-
ing” of the formerly vertically-integrated corporation, is often
cited as a significant challenge to the eighty-year-old FLSA.  As
this Article has contended, however, these dynamics are not
entirely unexpected.
The Act’s framers intentionally structured it to provide lee-
way for courts and administrators to confront just such chal-
lenges, both old and new.  Congress broadly and flexibly
worded this legislation in 1938 with foresight about the need to
target diverse and evolving business relationships over time.
164 See Reif, supra note 22, at 409–10 (2014) (arguing that a company that R
outsources work should be liable under FLSA when “that work was an integral
part of the company’s process of production of goods or provision of services, the
company knew or had reason to know that individuals hired by the contractor
were performing its outsourced work but did not prevent that performance despite
its ability to do so, and performance of that work did not require any specialized
expertise or experience such that it could not be performed by individuals directly
employed by the company.”); see also Rubinstein, supra note 12, at 611 (“Quasi- R
employers are not employers in the traditional sense; however, the law considers
them to be employers because they may significantly interfere with an employ-
ment relationship, may have been delegated a significant amount of responsibility
with respect to terms and conditions of employment, may be joint or single em-
ployers, or otherwise have effective control over employees.”).
165 FLSA, Hearing Part 1, supra note 1, at 181 (statement of Hon. Frances R
Perkins, Secretary of Labor, Dept. of Labor) (“One of the greatest difficulties to be
overcome, [if the FLSA] is to be successful is that of enforcement.”).
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Moreover, they foresaw and sought to reduce incentives to
splinter off parts of the business, or to impose new business
formalities that evade the FLSA’s blanket reach.
On the FLSA’s eightieth birthday, this Article proposes that
the FLSA’s broad and flexible language, while not without
problems, should help courts and FLSA enforcers apply it to a
continuously evolving business environment.166  In other
words, Congress intended the FLSA to have an extensive reach
and for it to be highly adaptable to shifting winds in business
organizational patterns.  While scholars and the three
branches of government are the primary audiences for this
Article, the FLSA’s legislative history informs public discourse
on this pressing subject as well.  As new forms of business
arrangements pop up through online platforms and other
means, the public discourse too often starts with an assump-
tion of exclusion from the FLSA’s coverage.  For instance, when
referring to Uber drivers, many headlines somewhat incredu-
lously read “Are Uber Drivers Really Employees?,”167 as
opposed to “Are Uber Drivers Really in Business for Them-
selves?”168  The New Deal spirit of the FLSA’s legislative history
strongly advises us that we should start with the latter pre-
sumption, rather than the former.  The FLSA’s straightforward
statutory purpose is as weighty now as it was in the 1930s;
entities that directly or indirectly engage low-wage workforces
166 See Robert N. Willis, The Evolution of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 607, 608 (1972) (praising the FLSA’s ambiguous language as al-
lowing it to be applied broadly and stating, “[i]t is under the guise of the broad
commerce powers that the gradual, consistent extension of the coverage of the
Fair Labor Standards Act has been and will continue to be accomplished.”).
167 E.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Answer Will
Shape the Sharing Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/omribenshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-will-
shape-the-sharing-economy/#6da10dee5e55 [https://perma.cc/3GWF-LFW8];
Alison Griswold, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Trial That Could Devastate the
“Sharing Economy”, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
moneybox/2015/03/12/uber_lyft_employment_cases_juries_could_decide_the_
legal_fate_of_the_sharing.html [https://perma.cc/U9ES-SHXM]; Yuki Noguchi,
Gig Economy Renews Debate Over Whether Contractors Are Really Employees,
NPR (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/07/589840595/gig-econ-
omy-renews-debate-over-whether-contractors-are-really-workers [https://
perma.cc/7HWR-8LTB]; Michelle Quinn, Are Uber and Lyft drivers Employees?,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 28, 2015), https://advance.lexis.com/api/perma
link/ce14074d-4cff-488a-86c0-6c74aca938b2/?context=1000516 [https://per
ma.cc/6JQY-XZW7].
168 A similar search for news article titles phrasing the question as whether
Uber or ridesharing drivers are really in business for themselves, or are really
independent contractors, turned up zero articles.
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to provide work on their behalf should use their power over
workers’ wages and hours to ensure that these workers receive
legally mandated compensation for the work they perform.
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